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The Industrial Revolution. The Digital Age. These revolutions radically altered the
workplace and society. We may be on the cusp of a new era—one that will rival or
even surpass these historic disruptions. Technology such as artificial intelligence,
robotics, virtual reality, and cutting-edge monitoring devices are developing at a
rapid pace. These technologies have already begun to infiltrate the workplace and
will continue to do so at ever increasing speed and breadth.
This Article addresses the impact of these emerging technologies on the workplace
of the present and the future. Drawing upon interviews with leading technologists,
the Article explains the basics of these technologies, describes their current
applications in the workplace, and predicts how they are likely to develop in the
future. It then examines the legal and policy issues implicated by the adoption of
technology in the workplace—most notably job losses, employee classification,
privacy intrusions, discrimination, safety and health, and impacts on disabled
workers. These changes will surely strain a workplace regulatory system that is
ill-equipped to handle them. What is unclear is whether the strain will be so great
that the system breaks, resulting in a new paradigm of work.
Whether or not we are on the brink of a workplace revolution or a more modest
evolution, emerging technology will exacerbate the inadequacies of our current
workplace laws. This Article discusses possible legislative and judicial reforms
designed to ameliorate these problems and stave off the possibility of a collapse
that would leave a critical mass of workers without any meaningful protection,
power, or voice. The most far-reaching of these options is a proposed “Law of
Work” that would address the wide-ranging and interrelated issues posed by these
new technologies via a centralized regulatory scheme. This proposal, as well as
other more narrowly focused reforms, highlight the major impacts of technology
on our workplace laws, underscore both the current and future shortcomings of
those laws, and serve as a foundation for further research and discussion on the
future of work.
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INTRODUCTION
The workplace is never static. From the time of specialized craft workers, to
the Industrial Revolution, and more recently the onset of the Digital Age, the
workplace has been in constant flux.1 Some of these changes evolved slowly;
others were revolutions. Presently, we are on the cusp of another era of work, one
in which emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, automation, and
virtual reality have the potential to equal or even surpass the shocks caused by
previous revolutions in the workplace. 2
The changes wrought by emerging technology will likely take several forms.
Major changes in how certain types of work are performed—caused by innovations
such as robotics and self-driving vehicles—can be expected to cause significant
job losses that will aggravate preexisting cultural, social, and geographic conflicts.3
New technology will also transform the role of many human workers and their
relationship with employers. For instance, innovations in artificial intelligence and
other types of computing will interject themselves into the employer-employee
relationship in ways that our current workplace laws are incapable of handling.4
Moreover, advances in monitoring technology increasingly allow employers to
gather and use information about workers, oftentimes of a highly personal nature,
raising a multitude of questions about privacy and workers’ dependency on
employers. And, in the future, developments in virtual reality and related
technology are expected to emulate the complexity of in-person communications,
which will tear down many of the barriers that currently tie most jobs to specific
locations. This could dramatically alter how and where jobs are performed,
converting a substantially larger portion of the labor force into gig workers and
perhaps even leading to a time when there are few “workplaces” as traditionally
conceived. These technologies will also place enormous strains on our system of
workplace laws, which are often so old and rigid that telecommuting seems like
science fiction.5 This Article will explore these trends and others, discuss the
challenges they pose to the existing workplace regulatory regime, and propose new
policies to address them.
The frightening aspect of this emerging technology is not that it will change
how we work—what’s more alarming is the degree to which it may do so. Law in
the United States is often quite adaptable, providing judges and regulators leeway
to modify their approach to various legal issues. But only to a point. At times,

1

KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS : EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 4-6 (2012).
2 Cf. ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE S HOCK (1970) (arguing that rapid changes over short period of time
can cause serious societal harms).
3 These conflicts contributed to the surprising 2016 United States presidential election and the
growing political divides in this country and elsewhere. See also Section II.A (discussing job losses,
as well as job gains and changes likely to result from new technology); James Manyika et al., Jobs
Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation, McKinsey Global Institute 3334, 46-47 (Dec. 2017) (noting the major economic changes, including decades of wage stagnation,
following the Industrial Revolution despite productivity growth during much of that period),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-futureof-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages.
4
I use the term “workplace laws” to encompass the wide variety of labor and employment laws
that regulate the workplace, including those prohibiting employment discrimination, mandating the
minimum wage and overtime, and providing for employees’ safety and health.
5 See, e.g., infra note 13 & Section II.B.
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social changes are so great that they are unable to fit tolerably within the current
legal regime. When that happens, a threshold is breached, much like the
widespread labor unrest and violence that, in combination with judicial hostility to
workers’ rights, ultimately spurred the creation of federal labor law.6 New
technology’s potential to disrupt the labor market, in combination with workplace
laws’ current problems and limitations, make this tipping point a genuine
possibility. For example, technology is creating a “blended workplace” 7 in which
human workers constantly interact with technology. In this blended workplace,
technology is also increasingly automating various jobs and work tasks, while
simultaneously providing employers more tools to monitor and control workers—
thereby shifting the balance of power further toward business and away from
labor.8 And if workplace laws are unable to address this shift9 (or if they exacerbate
it, as seems the case now), then we could easily see massive disruptions that shake
not only the workplace, but society at large. 10 It is impossible to predict with
certainty whether this will happen or, if so, when. Yet this Article’s aim, in part, is
to explore this possibility and its ramifications for work and workplace regulation.
Society has long had to grapple with emerging technology and its impact on a
wide range of areas, such as crime, education, finance, and the environment. There
is much literature addressing these areas, but relatively less on technology’s impact
on the workplace. 11 To be sure, some literature has delved into technology’s impact
on work, but that scholarship is typically directed to specific and current
applications of particular technologies. 12 Such research is valuable, but largely
ignores the magnitude and breadth of changes to work that these technologies may
bring about. This Article fills that gap by addressing the broader landscape—a
landscape in which new technology has already begun to change the workplace
and will continue to do so on a much grander scale in the future.

6 William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109,
1111 (1989).
7 Credit for this term is owed to Professor Richard Myers. This concept could be analogized as a
workplace version of the “Internet of Things,” in which interconnected networks of “smart”
technology become a pervasive part of individuals’ lives. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of
Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 812-813 (2016).
8 Technology can also provide workers with additional tools to seek better working conditions,
such as better ways to monitor and share information about employers, but those tools will almost
certainly be a mere drop in the bucket compared to the larger trends working against them.
9 Technology will also likely create new extra-legal responses, although unlikely to a degree that
would begin to offset the negative effects of this problem. See infra note 251.
10 We are already seeing some evidence of this with the rise of populism in the United States and
elsewhere in the world. Work issues aren’t the only reason for this development, but it is a major
one. Michael Cox, Understanding the Global Rise of Populism, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
IDEAS 10-12 (2018).
11 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice
System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067 (2018); Mark Fenwick et. al., Legal Education in the Blockchain
Revolution, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 351 (2017); Jordan Diamond, Environmental Law and the
Changing Data Paradigm, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2017) (introduction to special journal issue on
environment and technology); Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology, and Modern Finance, 11
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159 (2016).
12 See, e.g., infra Section II.D (discussing potential for artificial intelligence to produce
discriminatory results in hiring and other personnel decisions); Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, & Jason
Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. REV. 735 (2017). Professor Stone’s valuable
book, From Widgets to Digits, provided a broad look at the effect of computers, among other things,
on the workplace. Stone, Widgets, supra note 1; see also infra note 209. This Article moves beyond
that era of change to a new one brought on by more recent technologies.
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Because of its more expansive focus, this Article differs from the current
literature in several important aspects. First, it examines several major emerging
technologies, rather than a single one. Although a deep dive into a narrow issue is
important, technology’s far-reaching impact on the workplace demands an equally
extensive appraisal. In addition, most modern technology does not operate in
isolation. For instance, many vehicles on the road today marry technologies as
varied as artificial intelligence, automation, and a variety of monitoring devices.
Thus, to understand how an autonomous vehicle—or any number of other
innovations—will affect the way humans work requires an understanding of the
ways in which numerous developing technologies work together.
This Article’s second contribution is to provide the scientific backdrop for
these technologies. Through information gathered via interviews with numerous
experts, it explains the basic principles underlying these technologies, as well as
many types of cutting-edge research that are pushing science in countless
directions. The purpose of this background is not to provide any rigorous scientific
claim. Rather, the aim is to provide key information about how the technologies
operate and how they are likely to affect the workplace. Although well known in
the scientific world, much of this information has not made its way to the legal
one.
Knowledge of how these technologies work is also key to the third contribution
of this Article: predicting how technology will impact work in the future. Most of
the experts I interviewed were understandably hesitant to make specific predictions
about future technological developments, and I make no claim to have additional
insights. That said, one can predict likely trends and how they will influence the
manner in which we engage in work. These trends, in turn, either create or
exacerbate legal and policy issues that society will be forced to contend with.
After Part I presents the scientific backdrop, Part II provides the Article’s
fourth contribution by setting out these issues and raising various options for
addressing them. A comprehensive set of proposals to tackle the myriad challenges
posed by emerging technology is beyond the scope of the Article. However,
whether or not new technology will prompt a true revolution in work, changes are
coming that will stress an already outmoded workplace regulatory scheme. Thus,
by exploring these issues and numerous possible solutions, my aim is both to raise
the alarm for policymakers and others invested in the regulation of work and to
help spur further discussion for the best path forward. In addition, I explore ways
to address more fundamental problems with workplace law that the advance of
technology will further highlight. Part III briefly discusses the most ambitious of
these options, a proposed “Law of Work” that would provide a consistent and
comprehensible body of law that lowers the cost of compliance for employers and
promises better enforcement for all workers, whether or not they are formally
considered “employees.” Although such a dramatic reshaping of workplace law is
unlikely to happen, this proposal helps to illustrate more discrete ways to lower
structural barriers to reform, some of which may be politically feasible. Finally, by
shining a light on issues that are on the horizon, the Article will hopefully prompt
policymakers and judicial actors to take into account how their decisions will
impact society in years to come.
It is imperative that we consider and prepare for the future. Although
innovation can produce many benefits, without a suitable policy response advances
in the workplace are expected to impose substantial and long-lasting harms. By
examining the likely trajectory of these developments and how they will impact
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the workplace, I aim to promote efforts to address the impending harms and reform
an already outdated workplace regulatory regime.
I. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
At the crux of this Article lies a great tension. On one hand is a focus on
cutting-edge technology that is developing at lightning speed. On the other is an
area of law that often makes Rip Van Winkle seem like a go-getter.13 That tension,
however, is major impetus for the Article itself, which aspires not only to highlight
the stress that new technology will place on an already outmoded system of
workplace laws, but also to spur policy and legal changes in way that has rarely
occurred in the past. That is a tall order, and not at all likely to happen. But the
degree to which technology is evolving, as well as the enormity of its potential
impact on the workplace and society at large, offer some prospect for reform.
To appreciate the nature and scope of technology’s impact on work, one must
first understand the technology itself. Accordingly, as a supplement to more
traditional research of relevant literature, I interviewed fifteen experts in robotics,
AI, virtual and augmented reality, and monitoring-related technologies—most of
whom work as faculty members or related roles at major research universities. 14
These interviews were not intended to represent a comprehensive scientific
consensus on any point. Rather, they provided a superior method for learning about
the scientific foundations for these technologies, an opportunity to question experts
on legal issues that most scientific literature does not grapple with, and a means to
explore possible avenues for future research and application of these technologies.
What follows is a description of these emerging technologies. Based on these
interviews and other research, I explore not only the current capabilities of these
technologies—including applications in the workplace—but pioneering research
that will help shape how the technology will develop in the future.
A. Artificial Intelligence
Although artificial intelligence (AI) has been in the public consciousness for
decades, it has had an evolving and often imprecise meaning. 15 Traditionally, AI
referred to what it sounds like: technology that exhibits actual “intelligence.” 16
There is no universally accepted definition of intelligence, but it typically refers to
some semblance of self-awareness, emotion, or sentience.17
This “true
intelligence” has been the goal of some researchers for decades, with no end in

13 As has frequently been described, labor and employment law changes very slowly, if at all, and
as a result often appears seriously outdated. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
14 Two interviewees worked in the private sector, focused both on research and real-world
applications of technology. See infra notes 77 & 92. Some of the university-associated experts were
also involved in commercial applications of research. See, e.g., infra note 37.
15 The term “artificial intelligence” was first coined in 1956, at an academic conference. Tanya
Lewis, A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence, LIVE SCIENCE, Dec. 4, 2014,
https://www.livescience.com/49007-history-of-artificial-intelligence.html.
16 Interview with Junier Oliva, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science, University
of North Carolina, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Aug. 28, 2018).
17 Chris Smith et al., The History of Artificial Intelligence, Univ. of Washington 4-9 (2006),
https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06au/projects/history-ai.pdf (discussing Turning
Test and alternatives).
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sight. Indeed, because of frustration over the lack of progress, the government
froze funding for this research in what is referred to as the “AI Winter.”18 As a
result, modern AI research has moved in a different direction, one in which the
tools used for true intelligence research have become the new face of AI.
The basic tools of AI research involve technology that uses data to “learn”—
that is recognize patterns and make predictions. 19 As a result, “machine learning,”
“deep learning,” “data mining,” “data analytics,” and other related terminology
more accurately describe today’s AI technology.20 This technology can be
separated into two broad categories. “Supervised AI” is a means to label a certain
input, such as analyzing a data set to identify a specific image like a tumor in a
medical scan21 or an individual in a crowd. 22 “Unsupervised AI” also analyzes data,
but does so to identify certain patterns or core characteristics.23 The burgeoning
area of AI legal research illustrates both categories. AI programs can analyze data
such as a large set of contracts to either identify contracts with certain
characteristics, like a choice of law provision (supervised AI), or to determine
patterns that help to describe or group the contracts (unsupervised AI).24
In addition to the many standalone uses of AI, it is increasingly becoming an
integral part of other emerging technologies. Robotics,25 autonomous vehicles,26
virtual reality,27 monitoring devices, 28 and numerous other applications and
research rely on AI. But even relatively simple devices are beginning to
incorporate AI. For instance, if you don’t like to vacuum or sweep, you may own
an autonomous vacuum from a company such as Roomba. What you may not
realize is that these vacuums have vastly improved in recent years thanks to AI.
Early Roomba models randomly traveled around a room, vacuuming and avoiding
hazards. More recent versions, however, move randomly at first, but collect data

18

Id. at 17-22 (describing freeze caused by frustration with lack of progress).
Oliva interview, supra note 16 (describing machine learning as a combination of computer
science and statistics).
20 I will use “artificial intelligence” or “AI” for the sake of clarity and because that is still the term
most people associate with this technology.
21 Interview with Brian Moynihan, Head of Health Technology and Informatics, University of
North Carolina, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Aug. 29, 2018); Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in
Healthcare Past, Present, and Future, 2 STROKE AND VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230 (2017) (discussing
general methods and examples of AI uses in health care); Dave Fornell, Examples of How Artificial
Intelligence Will Improve Medical Imaging, IMAGING TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Dec. 21, 2017 (video
demonstrating uses of AI for medical imaging), https://www.itnonline.com/videos/examplesartificial-intelligence-medical-imaging-diagnostics.
22 Oliva interview, supra note 16; Paul Mozur, Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame,
and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. Times, Jul. 8, 2018.
23 Oliva interview, supra note 16; Bernard Marr, Supervised v. Unsupervised Machine Learning—
What’s the Difference?, FORBES, Mar. 16, 2017.
24 Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice
of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 515-516 (2017). Several companies now sell AI legal software
and it is increasing its presence in law schools. See, e.g., Students Win AI Contest, CAROLINA L AW 3
(Fall-Winter 2018) (describing contest sponsored by Duke Law and SEAL Software).
25 See infra Section I.B.
26 See infra Section I.A; Matthew Hutson, How Researchers are Teaching AI to Learn Like a
Child, SCIENCE, May 24, 2018 (describing research using AI to improve autonomous vehicles to
control for uncertainty).
27 See infra Section I.C.
28 See infra Section I.D.
19
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along the way.29 The vacuums then use that data to develop travel patterns that
avoid learned hazards and more efficiently clean a room. Customers can even use
an app to view maps of their house that their Roombas have created. 30
AI applications like these are already being used widely and will likely grow
exponentially for many years. But there are limits and pitfalls to AI. Most broadly,
the original conception of true AI is very far off in the horizon, if achievable at
all.31 A central problem in achieving genuine artificial intelligence is the difficulty
in emulating the human mind, particularly its innate ability to make connections
among various pieces of information and use those connections to make
generalizations. Although AI can be trained to identify images—often better and
more effectively than humans32—it takes a tremendous amount of data and
processing power to achieve accurate results. But this same generalization
technique is so natural to humans that we can easily make many predictions and
identifications with relatively good accuracy.33 For instance, a child can quickly
learn what an elephant looks like and thereafter identify one quite easily, even
recognizing one in a picture with many other animals. 34 In contrast, a computer
must be fed thousands or more images of an elephant before it can learn enough
patterns to identify an elephant in a new picture—and still make mistakes at
times.35 Thus, comparisons of humans and AI often boil down to this
generalization: humans excel at quickly making connections and generalizations
that, on the whole, tend to be fairly accurate, while AI requires far more data and
training to perform the same tasks, but when successful, can be highly accurate.
That said, in some circumstances, AI can defy expectations, such as its ability to
reads lips far better than human experts.36
AI’s reliance on data is currently the most significant barrier to its real-world
application. To learn in a sufficiently accurate manner, AI programs not only
require massive amounts of data, but data that is organized in precise ways. This

29 Alex Hern, Roomba Maker May Share Maps of Users’ Homes with Google, Amazon, or Apple,
THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 25, 2017.
30 This feature generated controversy when Roomba’s CEO publicly noted that the company had
access to these maps and might sell them. Id.
31 See supra notes 17-18.
32 Man Against Machine: AI is Better than Dermatologists at Diagnosing Skin Cancer, EUROPEAN
SOCIETY FOR MEDICAL ONCOLOGY, SCIENCEDAILY, May 28, 2018; Mohammad Sadegh Norouzzadeh
et al., Automatically Identifying, Counting, and Describing Wild Animals in Camera-trap Images
with Deep Learning, 115 PROCEEDINGS, N AT’L ACADEMY SCIENCES E5716 (2018) (finding that AIequipped motion-sensor cameras can identify wild animals cheaply and quickly, with same accuracy
as crowd-sourced humans); Samuel Dodge & Lina Karam, A Study and Comparison of Human and
Deep Learning Recognition Performance Under Visual Distortions, arXiv:1705.02498 (2017)
(finding that while AI surpasses humans at some visual recognition tasks, humans are better with
distorted images), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.02498.pdf.
33 Hutson, supra note 26.
34 Tom Simonite, Algorithms that Learn with Less Data Could Expand AI’s Power, MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, May 24, 2016 (explaining that children can recognize images of animal after
one example, but image-recognition software by Google and Microsoft each use 1.2 million labeled
examples;
also
noting
research
to
decrease
demand
for
examples),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601551/algorithms-that-learn-with-less-data-could-expandais-power/.
35 Id.; Katyanna Quach, AI Image Recognition Systems can be Tricked by Copying and Pasting
Random Objects, THE REGISTER, Aug. 28, 2018 (describing studies showing AI image-recognition
software being tricked into mistaking images, especially uncommon groupings).
36 Manyika, supra note 3, at 24 (describing Google’s DeepMind lip-reading project and others
including reading x-rays and using artificial skin to identify textures and objects).
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often creates serious problems, because before using AI, and an organization must
collect a large amount of new data or reorganize previously collected data.37 For
instance, medical images are traditionally managed to allow a health-care provider
to view one image at a time, rather than allow a computer to analyze thousands of
images, which is required for it to learn. 38 As a result, only a minority of typically
large organizations are using AI in a significant way and, even then, are not fully
leveraging the technology. 39 This will change, of course, as organizations either
begin the expensive process of transforming their data or new organizations
develop with the knowledge of data management’s importance.40 In the interim,
however, a select few entities, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, possess
substantially more data than anyone else, giving them potentially oligopolistic
control over access. This advantage can limit advances in AI technology and
prompt questions about data security. 41
Other challenges to AI use include computer science limitations. Although
computing power isn’t responsible for current bottlenecks,42 other issues act as
roadblocks to current AI applications. For instance, computers are unable to tell if
a program “works” or if something is true or false. 43 Moreover, as AI advances,
computing power may become more a challenge, as there are certain types of
problems that current computing is unable to solve in a reasonable amount of
time.44 At some point, major advances such as quantum computing could clear
these and other hurdles, but this research is still in its infancy.45
Another significant shortcoming with AI, especially when considering its
application to the workplace and other human endeavors, is the difficulty in coding
fairness, empathy, judgment, and other hard-to-define normative concerns.46 This
means that skills requiring these types of characteristics will remain the province
of humans for the foreseeable future. But what tasks are better suited for AI?

37 Interview with Lawrence Carin, Co-Founder and Chief Scientist, Infinia ML & Vice Provost
for Research and James L. Meriam Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Duke
University, in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 20, 2018).
38 Id.; Jiang et al., supra note 21, at 241.
39 Arthur Cole, The Crucial Link Between AI and Good Data Management, TECHOPEDIA, Nov. 21,
2018,
https://www.techopedia.com/the-crucial-link-between-ai-and-good-datamanagement/2/33477.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., James Sanders, Facebook Data Privacy Scandal: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC, Dec.
11,
2018,
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/facebook-data-privacy-scandal-a-cheatsheet/#googDisableSync.
42 Carin interview, supra note 37 (stating that data management is bigger hurdle).
43
This is referred to as the “halting problem.” Aatish Bhatia, The Questions that Computers Can
Never Answer, WIRED, Feb. 5, 2014.
44 This is referred to as “NP Complete,” meaning it is impossible to solve, or “NP Hard,” meaning
that there is no efficient way for an algorithm to solve the problem. Erica Klarreich, Computer
Scientists Find New Shortcuts for Infamous Traveling Salesman Problem, WIRED, Jan. 1, 2013. On
the other hand, the existence of this problem is what cryptosecurity systems like blockchain
technology is based upon. Jeff John Roberts, Breaking Bitcoin with a Quantum Computer, FORTUNE,
Jan. 6, 2018.
45 Roberts, supra note 44.
46
Interview with Collin Lynch, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science, North
Carolina State University, in Raleigh, N.C. (Sept. 10, 2018); Francesca Rossi & Nicholas Mattei,
Building Ethically Bounded AI, arXiv:1812.03980
(2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.03980.
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As AI technology develops, it will influence countless jobs, some
significantly.47 Indeed, it has already begun making inroads in many industries.
AI’s influence, broadly speaking, is two-fold. One major use is often referred to as
“people analytics,” which involves using AI to analyze a company’s operations
and workers, usually to influence or make personnel decisions such as hiring,
scheduling, and compensation. 48 The other major use of AI is to replace human
workers or change the way they work.
In real-world applications, companies currently use AI for people analytics
more than as a substitute for human labor. Uber provides a good example of how
AI can influence traditional business models. After creating an online platform for
traditional taxi services, Uber has used AI to change the transportation industry in
other ways. The company employs data mining to monitor drivers and customers,
which enables them to price discriminate (through “surge pricing”), and IT uses
psychological tools specifically designed to maximize the supply of drivers at a
given time and place. 49 Uber, and others, even use AI software to handle most of
its interactions with drivers. 50
Although less developed than people analytics, AI has already begun replacing
human workers and that use is expected to grow exponentially as years go by. For
instance, AI is already producing published news stories, especially relatively brief
and formulaic “wire reporting.” 51 Similarly, a Chinese company has even started
using robotic news anchors to read AI-produced text.52 These uses are part of the
“natural language” AI field, where there have been major advances in recent years.
Machine language still remains a far cry from the complexity and nuance of human
speech,53 but in the future, as more data becomes available, developers will
continue to create better programs for tagging and processing words, which will
then produce more human-like results.
AI’s potential in the language-processing field is a prime illustration of AI’s
potential to displace human workers or change the way they work. As AI is better
able to interpret and use language like a human, it will not only replace humans
but alter how workers learn and do their jobs. 54 For instance, one strand of AI

47 Later, I discuss personnel-related uses of AI in more detail, especially with regard to risk of
discrimination. See infra Section II.D.
48
Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961,
964-973 (2017) (describing history and development of people analytics); infra Section II.D.
49 Noam Schreiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 2017.
50 Alex Rosenblat, When Your Boss is an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2018.
51 Google recently gave a major gift to the Reporters and Data and Robots (RADAR) news service,
which plans to combine the work of journalists, “Natural Language Generation” software, database
tools, and “editorial intelligence” to create up to 30,000 local stories a month, as well as automatically
generated graphics and video, in the United Kingdom and Ireland. PA Awarded €706,000 Grant from
Google To Fund a Local News Automation Service in Collaboration with Urbs Media,
https://www.pressassociation.com/company-news/pa-awarded-e706000-grant-google-fund-localnews-automation-service-collaboration-urbs-media/.
52 Taylor Telford, These News Anchors are Professional and Efficient. They’re Also Not Human,
WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2018.
53 Manyika, supra note 3, at 24.
54 Michael Chui, James Manyika, & Mehdi Miremadi, Four Fundamentals of Workplace
Automation, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (2015) (estimating that natural language advances could
increase percentage of job tasks that can be automated from current 45% to 58%),
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/four-fundamentals-ofworkplace-automation.
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research is developing applications that can improve learning. 55 Among its
potential uses is to help attorneys better structure legal arguments. 56 More
generally, AI tools can determine how students or workers learn and what type of
educational or training techniques are likely to work best. 57
AI is a technology that has amazing potential in the workplace, yet also
significant limits. For instance, although some have proposed AI as a replacement
for many legal tasks, others doubt that it can replace the judgment and empathy
often required of attorneys. 58 Current technology is good at sifting through
documents and predicting which will be relevant to a case, but—at this point—AI
is unable to successfully advise clients, negotiate, and write legal documents. 59
Consequently, AI will increasingly take over simpler legal tasks that paralegals
and more junior attorneys typically perform. Humans, however, will continue to
perform higher-level functions, both in the legal field and others, for the
foreseeable future.60
In sum, the promise of AI has been just that: much promise, but with
significant limitations.61 As a result, AI’s application in real-world situations is still
largely a work in progress, which means that there is a great deal of uncertainty
surrounding its ultimate effect on the workplace. Nevertheless, AI use in the
workplace will almost certainly grow as time goes on, likely in dramatic—and, at
times, unexpected—ways.
B. X Reality
“X Reality” or “XR” is a relatively new term that is gaining some acceptance
as the most inclusive terminology for altered-reality environments.62 Most readers
will recognize virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) as the two most
prominent forms of XR, although they are not the only ones. To understand the
difference between these related, but distinct, types of technologies, think of a

55 Stefan A.D. Popenici & Sharon Kerr, Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on
Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, RESEARCH & PRACTICE IN TECHNOLOGY ENHANCED
LEARNING 12:22 (2017).
56 Lynch interview, supra note 46.
57 For instance, AI can analyze individuals’ use of online tools and how they network with each
other in productive, or unproductive, ways. Id. (noting that studies of MOOCs show that poor
students tend to communicate exclusively with each other while good students tend to communicate
exclusively with each other).
58 Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet. N.Y. TIMES, Mar 19,
2017 (citing software that can provide a list of cases most relevant to clients and another software
that can provide two-page memoranda answering legal questions—currently with editing from
humans); Remus & Levy, supra note 24, at 536 (estimating that AI adoption could, in five years’
time, reduce lawyers’ work by 2.5% annually); James Manyika et al., Harnessing Automating for a
Future that Works, McKinsey Global Institute (2017) (estimating that 23% of attorney’s job could
be automated with technology currently in use or being tested), http://www.mckinsey.com/globalthemes/digital-disruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works.
59 Lohr, Legal Work, supra note 58.
60 Id.; Remus & Levy, supra note 24, at 538. But see Chui et al., supra note 54 (noting that only
4% of U.S. occupations require creativity at median level of human competency and 29% of
occupations require median level of empathy).
61 Gary Marcus, Artificial Intelligence is Stuck. Here’s How to Move it Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Jul
29, 2017 (describing, among other limitations, broad problems with AI systems’ comprehending
complex visual scenes and following simple directions).
62 Sai Krishna V.K., Looking Beyond the Screen. X Reality, MEDIUM, Nov. 30, 2017,
https://medium.com/scapic/looking-beyond-the-screen-x-reality-fbda82e2ebfd.
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spectrum of reality. At one end of this continuum is the natural world and at the
other is a fully computer-generated immersive experience. VR is at this far end,
encompassing more of an immersive experience, while AR (sometimes referred to
as “mixed reality”) is in the middle. 63
Because VR technology is still developing rapidly, its experiences lie along a
spectrum as well. At one extreme is a “true” VR experience, in which a user is
fully immersed in the VR environment; that is, everything sensed by the user is
computer generated. However, the technology required for that level of experience
is far off, with most experiences currently limited to sight and sound. 64
Additionally, a true VR experience would be seamlessly three dimensional,
allowing, for instance, users to walk and move their heads with the VR inputs
changing accordingly and instantly.65 Because of limits on eye- and body-tracking,
as well as computing power, this level of experience is beyond the reach of most
current technology. 66
The two primary types of VR systems in use today involve displays that are
either head-mounted, covering the users’ eyes and ears, or a room set up with
projectors.67 Although these systems are becoming quite adept at providing
realistic environments for certain aspects of a users’ experience, the technology
still has a long way to go. In addition to providing only sight and sound in most
instances, processing speed has been a major hurdle. The level of computing
required to maintain a realistic experience—one that avoids problems of
perception and can seamlessly follow a users’ movements without lagging—is
immense.68 Thus, higher quality VR systems today are quite expensive,
cumbersome, and often uncomfortable.69
Although widespread use of truly immersive VR is still far off, researchers are
exploring ways to improve the experience, such as incorporating additional senses,
particularly touch (“haptics”).70 Although this research is still at a fairly basic level,
there has been progress, including full-body exoskeletons that mimic certain types
of touch, albeit in a cumbersome and inefficient way.71 What looks more promising
in the near term is “sensory substitution.” Because the human brain acts like a
pattern-matching machine, it can be trained to associate certain inputs—like a
vibration—with another sense. 72 For instance, researchers have enabled deaf users

63

JASON JERALD, THE VR BOOK: HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN FOR VIRTUAL REALITY 29-30 (2016).
Telephone interview with Karen Chen, Assistant Professor, Department of Industrial and
Systems Engineering, North Carolina State University (Aug. 29, 2018). Aside from seeing and
hearing, touch is sense furthest along in development. HELEN PAPAGIANNIS, AUGMENTED HUMAN, ch.
3 (2017)
65 Jerald, VR BOOK, supra note 66, at 9; Virtuix, Hands-On with VR OmniDirectional Treadmill
(video
showing
VR
treadmill
that
approximates
spatial
movements),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mi3Uq16_YQg.
66 Jerald, VR BOOK, supra note 66, at 48-52 (noting other technological barriers).
67 Interview with Regis Kopper, Assistant Research Professor, Department of Mechanical
Engineering and Materials Science & Director of the Duke immersive Virtual Environment (DiVE),
Duke
University,
in
Durham,
N.C.
(Sept.
6,
2018);
DiVE,
About,
http://virtualreality.duke.edu/about/.
68 Jerald, VR BOOK, supra note 66, at 184-193 (describing “latency” issues).
69 Chen interview, supra note 64; Kopper interview, supra note 67.
70 Papagiannis, supra note 64, ch. 3. Senses such as taste and smell are extremely difficult to
emulated digitally. Id. ch. 5; Jerald, VR BOOK, supra note 66, at 109.
71 The exoskeleton can, for instance, provide resistance to allow the feeling of movements such
as shaking another’s hand. Chen interview, supra note 64.
72 Moynihan interview, supra note 21.
64
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to “hear” a word by associating certain vibrations with a certain object.73 Sensory
substitution might be able to provide the same results for other senses or even
phenomena that humans are usually unable to detect like infrared waves,
electromagnetic fields, and radiation.74
In the middle of the XR spectrum is AR, which superimposes images and
sounds, and perhaps other inputs in the future, on top of what the user is
experiencing in the real world. 75 It is essentially a mid-point between the real world
and true VR. Google Glass and Pokémon Go are the most well-known examples
of this technology.76
Perhaps counterintuitively, AR technology is much further behind VR, and
could take up to a decade before its use becomes widespread. 77 The reason for this
discrepancy is that developers can fully control the VR experience, while AR must
work with the real, often unpredictable, world. This means that aspects of AR, such
as head tracking, require more speed and precision than an artificial VR
environment to keep up with users’ movements in relation to the physical
environment.78 Similarly, it is difficult to create technology that interacts well with
the real world, such as placing a virtual cup on an actual table. Although it may
seem trivial, this requires technology to accurately and rapidly match a digital
object with objects and movements outside of its control. 79
Although XR technology is still largely in its early stages, its use is quickly
gaining traction is some areas and is poised for explosive growth at some point.
Among its original applications were in gaming and other types of entertainment.80
Meanwhile, until around 2012, most non-entertainment uses of XR were limited
to researchers and the military,81 with only a few niche applications in the private
sector, such as the oil and gas industry.82 Recent funding for XR research has been
increasing to the point that one might call it a boom period,83 but the technology’s

73 Kortny Rolston, Tongue Mapping Research: CSU Device Lets You Hear with Your Tongue,
COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY SOURCE, Jan. 12, 2015, https://source.colostate.edu/words-mouthcsu-device-lets-hear-tongue/.
74 This is done by repeatedly exposing users to vibrations or other prompts in the presence of these
“invisible” substances until users develop something like a “sixth sense.” For instance, researchers
have been able to train users to sense the direction North. Josie Thaddeus-Johns, Meet the First
Human to Sense Where North Is, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 6, 2017.
75 Jerald, VR BOOK, supra note 66, at 29.
76 Pokémon Go, https://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-video-games/pokemon-go/; Nick
Bilton, Why Google Glass Broke, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015.
77 Telephone interview with Jason Jerald, CEO and Co-Founder of NextGen Interactions &
Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science, Duke
University (Oct. 2, 2018).
78 Id.
79 Kopper interview, supra note 67.
80 Jerald, VR BOOK, supra note 66, at 26.
81 XR can be useful for pointing out objects with more precision, such as weapons marksmanship,
which is one reason why the military is currently conducting trials on AR training. Interview with
Edgar Lobaton, Associate Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, North
Carolina State University, in Raleigh, N.C. (Sept. 4, 2018).
82 Kopper interview, supra note 67; Jerald interview, supra note 77.
83
This includes Oculus Rift, which ran a record-setting $2.4 billion Kickstarter campaign in 2012,
followed two years later by Facebook’s $2 billion purchase of the company. Eric Chevalier, Ossic
Dethrones Oculus as the Highest Grossing VR Kickstarter Ever, VR SCOUT, Apr. 21, 2016,
https://vrscout.com/news/ossic-beats-oculus-kickstarter/#.
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production levels are still at an early and limited stage.84 However, some of this
research demonstrates the technology’s potential.
One of the most promising areas for XR technology is the health-care field.
Some early applications involved therapeutic uses, such as for phobias or pain
distraction. For instance, some pediatric hospitals use the technology to allow
children to virtually immerse themselves in the hospital setting prior to surgery to
lower anxiety. 85 Also, XR has been employed in physical therapy treatments,
allowing therapists to treat patients remotely and to provide more effective care by
providing visual cues that patients can track with their bodies. 86 Imaging is another
potential use for XR, such as allowing a surgeon to “look” inside patients in
situations where observation would be otherwise impossible.87
Health-care applications of XR illustrate the technology’s potential in the
workplace, particularly for education and training. One line of research is
exploring ways that XR can improve the way we teach. For instance, an AR
program could provide a teacher cues about a student’s reactions to material, which
would permit more tailoring to individual learning styles. 88 XR can also be
particularly useful to better train manufacturing and other technical workers.
Indeed, some employers are already using XR for training, such as superimposing
visual directions on top of real-world objects that workers manipulate.89 A similar
example under development involves using AR-enabled tablets that assembly-line
workers place in front of a part; the AR system then shows a video of the part
moving in its proper place.90 One recent application of this type of training involves
athletes. Stanford’s football team, looking for additional practice time that didn’t
count against NCAA limits, began using XR technology to give quarterbacks more
decision-making experience under game-like conditions—with results positive
enough that its use is quickly spreading to other teams.91
This application demonstrates XR’s potential for training workers to handle
hazardous or stressful conditions. For instance, a firefighter I interviewed has been
using an XR video game in his department to improve communications under
dangerous and stressful situations. 92 Researchers are also developing XR
technology that allow firefighters to more realistically and safely train how to enter

84
Peter Graham, VR Industry Sees Positive Growth as Q3 Headset Sales Hit 1.9 Million, VR
FOCUS, Dec. 4, 2018, https://www.vrfocus.com/2018/12/vr-industry-sees-positive-growth-as-q3headset-sales-hit-1-9-million/.
85 Jennifer Marcus, Virtual Reality in Pediatrics, Children’s Hospital of Los Angeles (2017),
https://www.chla.org/virtual-reality-pediatrics.
86 Chen Interview, supra note 64.
87 For example, arthroscopic surgeries, in which the only current means of vision is via a camera
on the surgical device. Dustin K. Baker, Charles T. Fryburger, & Brent A. Ponce, The Emergence of
Augmented Reality in Orthopaedic Surgery and Education, 16 ORTHOPAEDIC J. HARV. MED. S. 8
(2015).
88 Lobaton interview, supra note 81.
89 Sarah Ritter, Building the Future: Deere Works to Attract a New Generation of Manufacturing
Workers, QUAD CITY TIMES, Oct. 21, 2018 (describing John Deere’s use of VR); Adi Robertson,
Walmart is Putting 17,000 VR Headsets in its US Stores for Training, THE VERGE, Sept. 20, 2018.
90 Researchers are determining whether and to what extent this type of training improves
traditional methods. Chen interview, supra note 64.
91
Lindsay Schnell, Unreal: Virtual Reality is Changing How Football Teams Train, Recruit,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 5, 2015.
92 Interview with Blake Boyd, Lead Technical Adviser and Data Analyst, Town of Cary, North
Carolina Fire Department, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 11, 2018).
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a burning building, avoid risky areas, and find and recover victims. 93 This
technology is at its early stages now, but will eventually provide low-cost, safe,
and effective training for dangerous situations.94 Further, XR might be able to help
workers with higher-level tasks like cognitive understanding and memorization,
particularly under different workload stresses, as well as detecting hazards.95
More cutting edge research is exploring the use of electroencephalography
(EEG)96 and eye-tracking97 to, among other things, improve XR’s capabilities and
quality of experience.98 Although many of these techniques are currently quite
expensive and not particularly effective, some show promise. In one study, for
instance, VR users were able to move objects in a game with only their thoughts. 99
This “biofeedback” technique was difficult to control precisely, but proved the
concept’s potential for application that could increase worker productivity, reduce
repetitive motion injuries, and assist disabled workers.100
With the promise of XR technology, however, comes some concerns. Primary
among them is privacy. XR technology will increasingly capture a significant
amount of personal data from workers and other users, including their facial
expressions, body movements, and eye reactions. Developers have legitimate
interest in such data, which often is essential to improving the XR experience.101
But this data can also provide significant personal information about users,
including their mental health and likely success at particular tasks.102 It also raises
the specter of increased employer monitoring of workers. Thus far, privacy has not
been a major focus of XR researchers, but as the technology’s application expands,
we will need to find ways to balance workers’ privacy interests with the needs of
developers.103
As XR becomes more prevalent, it will also create issues with the workspace
itself. The technology will increasingly allow workers to interact in more
meaningful ways with individuals in different geographic locations, thereby

93 Zach Myers, Virtual Reality Training on Display at Downtown Firefighters Convention,
WTTV, Apr. 25, 2018, https://cbs4indy.com/2018/04/25/virtual-reality-training-on-display-atdowntown-firefighters-convention/.
94 Kopper interview, supra note 67. The National Institute of Standards is funding projects to test
consistent communications standards for more coordination in the future, and XR research to help
test new technologies and interfaces. Kimberly Underwood, NIST Takes Interoperability to New
Heights, AFCEA Signal, Jul. 1, 2018, https://www.afcea.org/content/nist-takes-interoperabilitynew-heights.
95 Kopper interview, supra note 67; supra note 74.
96 See infra notes 100, 167.
97 Adi Robertson, I Tried Magic Leap and Saw a Flawed Glimpse of Mixed Reality’s Amazing
Potential, THE VERGE, Aug. 8, 2018 (reviewing $2,295 AR headset with eye-tracking); Jerald
interview, supra note 77 (predicting that eye-tracking will become standard in all but the cheapest
XR systems in a couple of years).
98 Simpler uses include controlling a smart phone with your eyes or, later, thoughts. Moynihan
interview, supra note 21.
99 Rachel Metz, Mind-Controlled VR Game Really Works, MIT TECHNOLOGY R EVIEW, Aug. 9,
2017.
100 Id.; Loren Grush, Those “Mind-Reading” EEG Headsets Definitely Can’t Read Your Thoughts,
THE VERGE, Jan. 12, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/1/12/10754436/commercial-eegheadsets-video-games-mind-control-technology.
101 Jerald interview, supra note 77.
102
Tom Ward, AI and VR Could Completely Transform How Doctors Diagnose and Treat Mental
Disorders, FUTURISM, Aug. 4, 2017.
103 For instance, one could allow developers access only to users’ summary data. See infra Section
II.C.
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making physical location irrelevant for a broader range of jobs.104 Relatedly,
employers will need to create areas that accommodate workers who are interacting
with people and objects in different physical spaces.105 But XR can help address
this problem and other spatial workplace concerns. The technology is already
being used for architecture and real-estate businesses, which take advantage of
immersive, three-dimensional modelling. 106 Businesses could use these tools,
along with AI, to visualize and virtually walk through work spaces before they are
built to promote designs that reduce conflicts, enhance worker interactions, and
provide greater access for workers with disabilities.107
Finally, as employers try to integrate XR, they will face some resistance as
workers adjust to the significant and unfamiliar ways the technology changes how
they perform tasks and interact with their environment. Both VR and AR can be
unsettling or confusing to users because they remove or alter the normal physical
cues we use to navigate the world, which in turn frequently causes eye strain,
dizziness, and nausea.108 A related hurdle involves ease-of-use issues. When faced
with technology that provides a particularly unusual experience, individuals often
have a natural reluctance to try the technology or stick with it when things don’t
go according to plan.109 The challenge for XR researchers and employers alike will
be to develop experiences that are as seamless and natural as possible, while
providing incentives to give the technology a chance.
C. Robotics and Other Types of Automation
Automation is the emerging technology that is likely most familiar, and most
frightening, to the public. Robots and related applications can greatly improve
people’s lives, but their potential to replace human workers also creates a justified
sense of foreboding. However, this technology is not an all-or-nothing proposition.
Although it will prove beneficial to some and ruinous to many others, a large
number of workers will co-exist with automation in a new blended workplace
where many tasks will be performed by an amalgamation of human workers and
automation.
The basic framework for robotics and other automation is a marriage of
hardware and software. The hardware involves a robot’s physical properties, such

104 See infra Section II.F. Programs such as Facebook Spaces, already permit users to use VR
hardware to interact virtually (“telepresence”). However, the growth of mobile work arrangements
has recently been tempered somewhat as companies increasingly realize the value of workers
interacting in person and because labor costs in other countries has been rising. Steve Lohr, Hot Spot
for Tech Outsourcing: The United States, N.Y Times, Jul. 30, 2017 (stating that offshoring increased
at an annual rate of 15% from 2011-2016, but is expected to slow to 8% annually from 2016-2021).
105
There are also potential intellectual property issues. For instance, Snapchat created an
augmented reality art project with the artist Jeff Koons, which was subsequently altered by others.
Anna Codrea-Rado, Virtual Vandalism: Jeff Koons’ “Balloon Dog” is Graffiti-Bombed, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2017.
106 Kopper interview, supra note 67.
107 Id.
108 Nausea is especially problematic with VR because the body is stationary while visual cues are
in motion (the reverse problem of reading in a moving car). This and other symptoms typically
diminish as individuals use the technology more, and researchers are looking into tools, such as
software modifications, to mitigate this problem. The level of discomfort also varies considerably
among individuals, so VR applications have begun using sensitivity-level ratings. Jerald, VR B OOK,
supra note 66, at 200-203.
109 Id. at 277-278 (describing techniques to improve human-centered interaction with VR).
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a base, appendages, and possibly means to move around a physical space, such as
wheels. These hardware components can be relatively straightforward to develop
and use, but others can present significant challenges. For instance, robots
currently used in various manufacturing settings are often well-suited to their jobs
and need little improvement.110 On the other hand, uses in other settings remain
extremely challenging. By way of example, one of the experts I interviewed is
conducting research on robotic surgical tools.111 These steerable medical
instruments, which resemble a flexible and moveable “needle,” can allow
procedures that are impossible with current technology, such as removing a tumor
in the brain via the relatively inobtrusive nasal cavity or a taking a biopsy from the
lung without piercing it.112 The biggest issue for this type of automation is that
navigating the human body presents serious hurdles, including unpredictable
movements by the patient; a complex set of obstacles with vastly different
characteristics (e.g., tissue, nerves, and blood vessels); and a high-risk environment
in which a single mistake poses severe consequences. 113
The other major component of automation is software, which is the key to
determining a robot’s movements, including both locomotion and manipulation of
objects. Software, increasingly through AI technology, also allows robots to
monitor their surroundings and learn assigned tasks. 114 Although robotics have
come a long way, developing software that provides either autonomous or semiautonomous automation often remains extremely problematic—even for tasks that
are simple for humans. For instance, programming a robot to spoon sugar from a
bowl to a cup has a lot of complexity. 115 The robot must learn how to scoop the
sugar, keep the spoon level to avoid spilling, find the cup, avoid obstacles, and
rotate the spoon to dump the sugar into the cup. Humans are very good at
intuitively figuring out how to navigate these challenges, but robots must learn or
be taught every one of these steps.116 And, although developers can individually
program robots for specific tasks like this, it is impractical in real-world situations
because of the scale involved. As a result, current research is exploring more
efficient ways to teach robots or have them able to learn such tasks on their own. 117
The combination of hardware and software challenges poses significant
restraints on automation’s application in the workplace and elsewhere. Take a
robot’s need for perception, such as a home-care robot making a cup of sweetened
tea. The robot must be able to sense the bowl of sugar, the spoon, the cup, and
obstacles and have the physical ability to manipulate or avoid these objects.

110

Nick Wingfield, As Amazon Pushes Forward With Robots, Workers Find New Roles, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2017.
111 Interview with Ron Alterovitz, Professor, Department of Computer Science, University of
North Carolina, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Aug. 30, 2018); Momen Abayazid et al., Experimental
Evaluation of Co-manipulated Ultrasound-guided Flexible Needle Steering, 12 INT’L J. MEDICAL
ROBOTICS & COMPUTER ASSISTED SURGERY 219 (2016).
112 University of North Carolina Computational Robotics, Motion Planning for Steerable Needles,
https://robotics.cs.unc.edu/SteerableNeedles/index.html.
113 Abayazid et al., supra note 111.
114 See supra note 29; interview with Kris Hauser, Associate Professor, Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, Duke University, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 4, 2018).
115 Gu Ye & Ron Alterovitz, Demonstration-Guided Motion Planning, PROC. INT’ L SYMPOSIUM
ON ROBOTICS RESEARCH (2017), https://robotics.cs.unc.edu/publications/Ye2011_ISRR.pdf.
116 Alterovitz interview, supra note 111.
117 University of North Carolina Computational Robotics, Demonstration-Guided Motion
Planning for Assistive Robots, https://robotics.cs.unc.edu/DGMP/index.html.
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Similarly, a semi-autonomous surgical tool must have the capacity to sense both
the controls provided by the physician and obstacles in the patient, while having
the appropriate physical properties to maneuver in a human body.118 These and
other robots must be designed with materials that can often be used for different
tasks; have sensors to collect information; and software—likely enhanced with AI
technology—to process and use the collected data. 119
As a result of these challenges, we should not expect to see widespread
automation of complex tasks for a long time. 120 In contrast, more straightforward
and predictable uses of automation, especially in controlled environments like a
warehouse or assembly line, have become increasingly widespread. This
prevalence, in turn, has led to understandable fears about the displacement of
workers.
Automation’s threat to human jobs is real, but more complex than often
portrayed.121 In the next Part, I examine the risk of job losses from all types of
technology and won’t repeat that discussion here. However, two illustrations are
worth highlighting now, as they shed light on the current state of automation
technology and provide more context for the discussion of when, if ever, certain
jobs and tasks are at risk of being automated.122 The key driver of this question is
understanding the distinction between tasks at which humans excel versus those
better suited for automation.
The first example involves what appears to be a simple task. Simple, at least,
for a human. Consider Amazon’s warehouses, which use both automation and
human workers. Robots move around a specific area of the warehouse, transporting
identically shaped pallets of merchandise.123 These robots bring the pallets to
humans, who then place the merchandise in packages for shipment. 124 Why isn’t
this final step also automated? The answer is that while robots excel at moving
consistently shaped objects through predetermined paths, humans are far better at
determining how to pack different-shaped objects into a larger package. 125
Although this seems like a relatively simple task, the science behind trying to

118 Alterovitz interview, supra note 111 (analogizing challenge to developing a car that can
navigate a three-dimensional space inside a living human). The need for perception means that
robots—especially those interacting with humans and our environments—will be able to observe us
and gather an incredible amount of personal data. See infra Section II.C (discussing monitoring and
privacy issues).
119 For example, a robot with multiple appendages, such as multiple joints and sensors, requires a
tremendous amount of coordination, long-term planning, and machine-learning skills, which is
difficult to design and operate. Hauser interview, supra note 114.
120 Alterovitz interview, supra note 111.
121 As discussed in more detail in Section II.A, while automation has the potential to impact a
significant number of workers, its biggest impact is likely on the tasks that workers perform. For
instance, one study estimates that current technology could replace 45% of current paid tasks, which
are performed for approximately $2 trillion in annual wages. Chui et al., supra note 54 (also
estimating that 60% of occupations could have 30% or more of their tasks automated, but only 5%
of occupations could be fully automated).
122 Currently, there has not been evidence of significant job displacement outside of select
situations, although this could be a more substantial problem in various regions and in the future.
Chico Harlan, Rise of the Machines, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2017; Noam Scheiber & Nick Wingfield,
Amazon’s Job Fairs Sends Clear Message: Now Hiring Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2017
(stating that Amazon’s “aggressive” use of robots thus far has not been replacing workers, although
some expect that to change in a decade or more),
123 Wingfield, supra note 110.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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automate it is so difficult that Amazon regularly holds robotics challenges to help
solve the problem. 126 Yet the human Amazon workers remain.
The underlying reason for this division of work at Amazon is the difficulty in
developing robots that can efficiently manipulate unexpected objects and perform
other similarly complex tasks. 127 Moreover, it is very hard to design robots to
operate in more varied or unpredictable environments, such as ones that involve
humans.128 Other hurdles to the adoption of automation include managers’ lack of
familiarity and trust in technology, 129 humans’ ability to more quickly address and
anticipate problems,130 and robots’ inability to improve processes. 131 For instance,
even in BMW’s highly automated South Carolina plant, human workers still play
a central role, particularly for manufacturing that is customized or sensitive to how
a customer interacts with the product. 132 As a result, automation is developing
slowly in most industries, and Amazon workers and others in similar, “low-skill”
jobs will likely not be replaced by robots anytime soon.133 This is true even though
automation promises lower labor costs, improved efficiency, and avoidance of
labor shortages—all at prices that continue to decline. 134
The second example involves an industry in which the fear of automation has
captured the public’s attention like no other: transportation and the threat posed by
autonomous (or “self-driving”) vehicles. Autonomous vehicles symbolize many
people’s fears about automation, particularly given the number of workers who
drive for a living. These vehicles also demonstrate many of the incredible ways in
which technology has developed, as well as the many limitations to its application.
The potential effect of autonomous vehicles on jobs is substantial, with
approximately 1.7 million long-haul truck drivers and 1.7 million drivers of taxis,
buses, and other commercial vehicles on the road today. 135 Autonomous vehicles
aren’t limited to the ground, however. Both shipping and air travel have been at
the forefront of using this technology, with the vast majority of sea passages and
flights today relying heavily on autopilot.136 In fact, for most passenger flights,
humans actively pilot the plane for only an average of three to seven minutes. 137
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Amazon Robotics Challenge 2017 Won By Australian Budget Bot, BBC NEWS, Jul. 31, 2017.
Hauser interview, supra note 114.
128 Id.
129
Craig Torres, Why the Robot Takeover of the Economy is Proceeding Slowly, 127 BNA DAILY
LAB. REP. 15, Jul. 5, 2017.
130 Id.
131 Id. (quoting an BMW official: “I have never been inspired to do more by a robot, I have never
gotten any ideas on how to improve something on the shop floor from a robot.”). However, data
analytics is an increasingly important tool for humans looking to improve processes. Id.
132 Id. (noting that “[h]umans are paying close attention to look, feel, smell, and even the sound
of these cars to ensure BMW authenticity.”).
133 Id. (stating that the finance industry is an exception, where machine decision-making is taking
over human work at a more rapid pace). However, other jobs, such as cashiers, are likely to be
automated in the near future. Claire Cain Miller & Quoctrung Bui, Switching Careers Doesn’t Have
to Be Hard: Charting Jobs that are Similar to Yours, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2017.
134 Harlan, supra note 122. Many robots are now available for rent, making them even more
affordable. Id. (citing a company that leases robots for $15 an hour).
135 Kevin Roose, As Self-Driving Cars Near, Washington Plays Catch-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21,
2017; Mark Scott, The Future of European Transit: Driverless and Utilitarian, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
2017 (describing attempts to introduce on-demand driverless vehicles that connect to existing public
transportation systems).
136 Chui et al., supra note 54.
137 Id.
127
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And although autonomous ground transportation is not commercially viable today,
the level of investment reveals the extent to which the transportation industry sees
driverless vehicles as the future. 138
The reasons why we see ships and planes regularly operating autonomously,
but not ground vehicles, demonstrates the complexities involved with certain
applications of technology. These complexities involve not only features required
for the technology itself, but also the environment in which it is designed to
operate. Consider how many different technologies must seamlessly coordinate
with each other in an autonomous vehicle. First, of course, is the hardware: the
actual vehicle that move, stop, turn, and perform whatever specific task it is
designed for (e.g., hauling cargo). Most current autonomous vehicle prototypes
emulate human-driven vehicles, albeit with some design modifications to
accommodate new technology. To make the vehicle autonomous or semiautonomous, however, requires other differences. Cameras and sensors are a key
feature of autonomous technology, as they place the vehicle in its environment,
track its movements, and sense various elements, objects, or conditions—such as
pedestrians, other vehicles, and inclement weather.139 AI and other software
process all of the data produced by these monitoring systems, along with preprogrammed algorithms that tell the vehicle what to do under certain conditions or
its overall goals, the most important being “don’t crash.”
By the 1990s, researchers had developed technology that allowed vehicles to
drive across the country on highways with almost total autonomy.140 But we’re still
a long time away from widespread use of vehicles with even close to this level of
autonomy. Why is this? This simplest answer is because most driving
environments are not like a controlled highway. Take a typical urban streetscape,
with multiple human-driven cars, pedestrians, bicycles, perhaps a squirrel or other
animal, street signs, street lights, a child running after a loose ball, and other
potential hazards like rain or snow. Each additional, hard-to-predict factor
dramatically multiplies the complexity involved with safely and efficiently
navigating the environment.141
One issue is simply the need to be identify possible hazards. Current vehicles’
monitoring systems can capture a substantial amount of information, but not all.
Indeed, many real-world autonomous vehicle accidents have been caused at least
in part by the vehicles’ monitoring systems failing to recognize pedestrians,
vehicles, or other hazards. 142 A recent insurance company test of this technology
vividly shows why this can happen. 143 In the test, the vehicle immediately in front
of a Tesla moves to a different lane—a situation that forces designers to make a
choice. If the only consideration is avoiding a crash, an autonomous vehicle should
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Daisuke Wakabayashi & Mike Isaac, Uber Executive Invokes Fifth Amendment, Seeking to
Avoid Potential Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2017 (describing suit by Waymo against Uber,
alleging theft as part of large investment in driverless technology, including $680 million purchase
of self-driving truck company at heart of dispute).
139 Monitoring of human drivers using semi-autonomous vehicles will likely be required as well,
to help prevent attention and other safety issues.
140 Kate Gammon, Future Past: Self-Driving Cars Have Actually Been Around for a While, Car
& Driver, Nov. 15, 2016 (describing 1995 trip from Pittsburgh to Los Angeles in which 98.2% of the
drive was autonomous, although human driver controlled brakes and hand throttle).
141
Hauser interview, supra note 114.
142 List of Driverless Vehicle Accidents, ITGS News, Jun. 2, 2018, http://www.itgsnews.com/listof-driverless-vehicle-accidents/.
143 Rory Cellan-Jones, Car Insurers Warn on “Autonomous” Vehicles, BBC NEWS, Jun. 12, 2018.
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stop whenever the preceding vehicle moves because there’s a chance that there is
an undetected hazard ahead, such as a vehicle that suddenly stopped. 144 This, of
course, is impractical in real-world conditions.145 But, allowing the autonomous
vehicle to continue moving creates a risk that it will not recognize an unseen hazard
in time to avoid a collision—which is precisely what happened in the test as the
Tesla plows into a stopped car.146 Our unwillingness to accept such risks, even if
they are less probable than human error in traditional vehicles, 147 erects a
substantial barrier to adoption of autonomous vehicles. Thus, improving these
vehicles’ ability to identify and react to hazards will be critical to their future. But
that is no easy task. Even if an autonomous vehicle is able to capture all relevant
data about its surroundings, its computers may not be able process the data quickly
enough to avoid a collision. The extraordinary variety and quantity of unexpected
situations on the road mean that the amount of machine training required is almost
limitless and therefore exceeds current technology.148
In addition to issues related to vehicle design, our current infrastructure is
poorly suited for autonomous vehicles. Some infrastructure improvements are
relatively simple, like painting street lines in a way that is more easily recognized
by vehicles’ monitoring systems.149 But more substantial changes would be
required to substantively decrease road hazards that autonomous vehicles may not
be able to avoid. Moreover, these vehicles are reliant on internal and external
communication systems, which require enough redundancies to handle
malfunctions without catastrophic results. 150 As a result of these limitations, the
vast majority of today’s autonomous vehicles have humans monitor the vehicle
and take control if necessary. 151 Waymo, the leader in attempts to commercialize
of self-driving vehicles, follows this practice for most of its tests, including a trial
service that allows customers to hail a self-driving taxi.152 The company has
discovered that the human supervisors retain an important role because its vehicles
exhibit many quirky driving behaviors as they engage in machine learning on city
streets.153 This behavior, as well as a healthy dose of skepticism about the
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Interview with Michael Clamann, Senior Human Factors Engineer, University of North
Carolina Highway Safety Research Center, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 10, 2018).
145 For instance, most vehicle autopilot systems are designed to ignore stationary objects, which
at times can lead to accidents. Jack Stewart, Tesla’s Autopilot Was Involved in another Deadly Crash,
WIRED, Mar. 30, 2018.
146 The “car” was actually a prop, but watching the test video is still not for the faint at heart.
Cellan-Jones, supra note 143.
147 Aarian Marshall, Tesla Bears Some Blame Self-Driving Crash Death, Feds Say, WIRED, Sept.
13, 2017 (noting finding that Teslas with self-driving capabilities crashed 40% less than those
without).
148
In contrast, humans are much better than machines at quickly assessing new situations.
Clamann interview, supra note 144.
149 See, e.g., Damon Arthur, Stripes on California Highway to Pave way for Self-Drive Vehicles,
TRANSPORT TOPICS, Jan. 22, 2018, https://www.ttnews.com/articles/stripes-california-highwaypave-way-self-driving-vehicles.
150 Clamann interview, supra note 144 (noting that autonomous vehicles would need to rely not
only on GPS and its monitoring systems, but also communicate with other nearby vehicles).
151 Jeffrey Fowler & Jhaan Elker, Self-driving Taxis are Here. This is What it’s Like Riding in
One., WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2018
(multimedia story describing Waymo’s self-driving taxis).
152 Michael Laris, Waymo Launches Nation’s First Commercial Self-Driving Taxi Service in
Arizona, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2018.
153 Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3334667

22

DRAFT

technology, has even led to a rash of attacks and harassing behavior toward
Waymo vehicles in neighborhoods where they have been tested. 154
In sum, it could be decades before autonomous vehicles are in widespread use.
For the near term, we’re more likely to see fully autonomous vehicles in less-risky
environments, such as slow-moving shuttles.155 In addition, we can expect
incremental expansion of semi-autonomous features on human-driven vehicles,
especially those than may enhance safety by stopping or slowing the vehicle when
a hazard is sensed. 156 But at some point in the future, technology, infrastructure,
and our acceptance of autonomous vehicles will advance enough to threaten the
jobs of human drivers.
The experience of autonomous vehicles and Amazon’s warehouse robots
provide some general lessons about the future of automation in the workplace. In
order to safely and effectively use robotic labor, employers will need to provide
controlled environments that do not create safety risk for human workers and do
not push the technology beyond its current limitations. 157 As a result, robotics will
be employed most often in workspaces that can be specially designed for them,
with limited human interactions.158 In contrast, adoption of automation will be
slow for businesses that are unable to exert that level of control. That said,
researchers are exploring ways to make robots better able to learn tasks and adapt
to changing conditions. But the ability of this technology to see widespread
adoption in the real world is still far off, as the technological hurdles remain
substantial.159 As a result, employers are most likely to automate tasks that tend to
be more discrete, repetitive, and in environments that are easily controllable; in
contrast, tasks involving self-awareness, judgment, and manipulation will remain
the province of humans for the foreseeable future.160
D. Monitoring Technology
Among the technologies explored in this Article, those that allow various types
of monitoring are by far the farthest along in development. As I describe in the
next Part,161 numerous applications of this technology already exist in many
workplaces and their uses are likely to grow exponentially in the near future.
Unlike AI, automation, and XR, there is no discrete category of research
devoted to monitoring. Instead, many different types of technologies either use or

154 Simon Romero, Wielding Rocks and Knives, Arizonans Attack Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2019.
155 Kroger’s new grocery delivery service in Arizona uses unmanned self-driving vehicles that
travel a maximum of 25mph. Peter Holley, Tired of Going to the Grocery Store? In Arizona, a RobotDriven Car will Deliver Groceries to Your Home, WASH. POST., Dec. 19, 2018.
156 Clamann interview, supra note 144; Lobaton interview, supra note 81 (noting current vehicles
with autonomous safety measures like cruise control and collision avoidance).
157 In particular, businesses must be aware of their workplaces’ geometry, including the physical
space in which a robot operates, as well as workers’ and other objects’ movement in that space.
Alterovitz interview, supra note 111.
158 Wingfield, supra note 110.
159 Alterovitz interview, supra note 111.
160 See infra notes 200-208. “Soft robotics” that can better emulate humans behavior and norms,
such as personal space, gestures, and expressions are currently being researched, but are still
relatively primitive. Hauser interview, supra note 114 (noting also that this technology must account
for cultural differences).
161 See infra Section II.C.
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focus on tools to monitor and collect information from the surrounding
environment. Related research is often driven by potential applications of the
technology, with health care being an area with potentially large benefits, yet also
serious risks.
A wide variety of medical monitoring devices are now relatively inexpensive
and widely available, such as heart rate monitors.162 Devices are also being
developed that can combine physiological measurements with environmental
data—all of which could provide predictions or warnings of potential health threats
for the user. 163 Moreover, monitoring that was previous limited to expensive
machines in the health-care setting are become the province of home users, such
as watches that measure a user’s EKG (electrocardiogram) readings.164 These
promise significant improvements in health care, 165 but also risks displacing some
health-care workers who currently provide such monitoring. In addition, the
amount of highly personal data collected by these devices raise serious privacy
issues, especially if under the control of third parties, such as employers.
This concern is not hypothetical. As discussed in detail below, employers
already engage in highly intrusive monitoring, such as implanting tracking devices
into workers’ arms.166 And new technology will only increase the ease with which
employers and others can gather personal information. For instance, consumers
can purchase EEG headsets that identify areas of users’ brains that are most active
in response to their environment.167 Although use of this data is currently limited,
it does identify activity in specific parts of the brain that control different physical
or mental functions.168 Other monitoring tools are further developed and can
already collect a tremendous amount of information. For example, technology that
collects and analyzes heart-rate variability can determine whether an individual
gets enough sleep or suffers from depression, stress, and other conditions. 169 In
addition, facial-recognition technology can make similar inferences—which
means that, with the right tools, someone can merely analyze a video of an
individual to gain a wealth of information about their health and well-being, as
well as their level of arousal, unconscious desire, and other types of interest.170
Such capabilities can be useful, but also raise significant privacy concerns,
especially if used inappropriately. Not all monitoring technology raise sinistersounding connotations, however. Attempts to improve workplace and other types
of safety are often reliant on monitoring devices, such as “smart” aerial vehicles,
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Tim Collins et al., How Reliable is Your Wearable Heart-Rate Monitor?, THE CONVERSATION,
Jun. 19, 2018.
163 For instance, patients could use monitoring technology to warn of an impending risk of an
asthma or heart attack, thereby allowing avoidance or other preventative measures. Lobaton
interview, supra note 81.
164
See, e.g., KardiaMobile, https://www.alivecor.com.
165 For instance, home monitoring promises significant clinical advantages because the data
gathered—such as heart rate or insulin levels—covers a much longer period of time than an isolated
visit to a health-care provider. Moynihan interview, supra note 21.
166 See infra Section II.C.
167 Grush, supra note 100.
168 Moynihan interview, supra note 21 (noting that current level of specificity is similar to using
crowd noise from outside a sports stadium to determine what’s happening).
169 Id.; Lobaton interview, supra note 81. GPS and other data can also be used to identify
individuals with depression and a variety of other serious mental illnesses. Saeed Abdullah &
Tanzeem Choudhury, Sensing Technologies for Monitoring Serious Mental Illnesses, 25 IEEE
MULTIMEDIA 61 (2018).
170 Id.; Moynihan interview, supra note 21.
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like drones, that can observe construction worksites and flag potential hazards
before they cause harm. 171
Workplace monitoring has been around for as long as there have been
workplaces, but technology has already given employers more means to gather
information about workers than ever before. As discussed below, technological
innovations will provide employers increased opportunities to pry ever more
deeply into workers’ personal information and thereby further underscore the lack
of privacy protections in the workplace. 172
II. TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON WORK LAW AND POLICY:
THE BLENDED WORKPLACE
The wide variety of emerging technologies and the divergent paths of future
innovation undermine attempts to make solid predictions about the future of
technology and its impact on work. However, technology has already created
numerous legal and policy workplace problems and promise others that are
plausible and serious enough to warrant attention now. Unfortunately, our current
workplace regulatory scheme is ill-equipped to handle many of these current
issues, much less ones that are on the horizon. As a result, although we can’t know
for sure whether we have entered a truly new era of work, emerging technology
will clearly exacerbate preexisting shortcomings in work law, perhaps to the point
where is ceases to function in any meaningful way.
As a preliminary matter, it worth keeping in mind that real-world applications
often involve the combination of various technologies. For instance, “smart”
prosthetics will combine robotics, advanced physiological and environmental
monitoring, and AI to enhance their functionality. 173 This means that many
emergent problems in the workplace will more often than not involve multiple
types of technology—technology that, in turn, will often operate in conjunction
with human workers in a “blended workplace.” As a result, policy and legal
responses must address complicated, coordinated technological systems and their
interaction with workers. In other words, we will need a coordinated effort to
adequately address the impact of technology on work, which is a sharp contrast to
our current, fractured workplace regulatory system that is typically very slow to
react to new problems. 174
What follows is an exploration of the current and future issues associated with
new technology and discussion of possible means to address them. This
exploration is not meant to be an exclusive prediction of what is to come or a
comprehensive path forward. Instead, my aim is to identify the most serious and
likely problems and highlight the ways in which our current set of workplace laws
and policies are inadequate to address these developing issues. Some of these
failings are merely exacerbated by technology, while others are new. But both raise
an alarm regarding how we currently regulate work and demonstrate the need to
significantly rethink how we should regulate in the future.

171 David Sparkman, OSHA Now Using Drones to Inspect Employer Facilities, EHS TODAY, Dec.
28, 2018.
172 See infra Section II.C.
173
Lobaton interview, supra note 81.
174 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing Workplace Law, 61 ALA.
L. REV. 1025, 1036-1049 (2010); cf. Roose, supra note 135 (describing three states that have begun
to address autonomous vehicles and the first congressional bill designed to address the issue).
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A. Changing the Who and How of Work
1. Technology’s Impact on the Labor Market:
Job Losses, Job Gains, and Job Changes
When it comes to the problems associated with emerging technology, the
potential for job losses captures the most attention, and for good reason. Not only
does this threat seem most acute, but it’s already started to a certain degree. Thus,
the prospect of rapidly advancing technology causing in massive job displacement
is a very real concern. However, that will not be technology’s sole impact on the
labor market.
For the past several decades, we have seen a transition from an economy
dominated by manufacturing and similar jobs to one in which knowledge-based
skills are prominent.175 New technology will both deepen this trend, as well as alter
it. Although much of the discussion regarding technology’s impact on the labor
market focuses only on job losses, the picture is more complicated. To be sure, job
losses will be an important part of the story, as well as job gains from some.
However, technology will likely impact the greatest number of workers not by
putting them out of work, but by changing how they work. The traditional secretary
position is a good illustration of this effect. Although typing speed used to be a
core component of the job, thanks to advances in computing the ability to type
quickly is barely required, if at all, for secretaries’ successor, the administrative
assistant.
Technology’s impact on the labor market will not be uniform. Overall, we can
expect technology to enhance productivity across the economy and produce an
overall increase in employment, although that’s not certain.176 Technology will
also improve the way work is done in many instances by making it more efficient
or safe.177 But these likely benefits will take time to develop and will not be felt
evenly across the economy. Moreover, technology will replace or devalue the labor
of many, as well as generate numerous other problems for workers in general. 178
In other words, technology is likely to produce widespread pain in the near-term
and create long-term winners and losers, with many losers experiencing
considerable harm.179 These effects will strain an already flawed system of
workplace laws, perhaps to the breaking point. Indeed, it is possible—albeit far
from certain—that the speed and the breadth of technology’s impact on the
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Stone, Widgets to Digits, supra note 1, at 67-77.
David Autor & Anna Salomons, Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity, Growth,
Employment, and the Labor Share, BROOKINGS PAPERS (2018) (finding that employment wages and
hours could rise, but that labor’s share of overall output could decline); Manyika, supra note 3, at 3638. However, just as technology may create a new era of work, it may also defy historical trends by
causing a net loss of jobs. Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work?, Automation and
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 271-274 (2018).
177 For instance, researchers are currently developing robots that collect and analyze samples from
the bottom of the ocean—activities that are extremely time consuming and hazardous. Nathan Hurst,
These Underwater Robots Offer a New Way to Sample Microbes From the Ocean, SMITHSONIAN,
Mar. 28, 2018.
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See infra Sections II.B-II.F.
179 Manyika, supra note 3, at 87-90 (describing potential for greater income polarization as
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economies).
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workforce may rival or even surpass the labor market disruptions of the Industrial
Revolution.180
Accurately predicting the long-term impact of still-evolving technology on the
labor market is not possible.181 That said, even imperfect appraisals can be helpful
in appreciating the potential scope of this issue. The McKinsey Global Institute
recently produced one of the more thorough estimates of technology’s impact on
jobs through 2030. 182 Their insights are useful, but should be taken with several
grains of salt. If there was one common theme throughout my interviews with
technology experts, it was an unwillingness to predict the development of
technology with any certainty, especially anything beyond a short timeline.
McKinsey’s own report reflects this hesitation, as it makes clear that it is not
providing specific forecasts. That said, the report identifies many general trends
that ring true to my research and conversations with experts.
Among the report’s most general estimates is that by 2030, automation has the
potential to replace 23% of labor hours in the U.S. and force between 75 to 375
million workers worldwide to switch occupations. 183 More specifically, the report
estimates that by 2030, between 400 to 800 million workers worldwide and 39
million in the U.S. could face some sort of job displacement as the result of
technological advances, although many of those with the right training could move
into newly created positions. 184 Even for workers who keep their jobs, a significant
number will shed some tasks and have to learn new skills. 185 The speed and degree
of such changes will depend on various factors such as future technological
developments, costs of applying innovations in the workplace, relevant labor
markets, expected financial benefits of replacing human labor, regulation, and
social acceptance of technology. 186
These overall figures mask significant differences among various segments of
the workforce. An often overlooked aspect of the labor market is that undergoes a
constant churn of jobs. Even periods of job expansion are accompanied by
significant job losses, just as periods of contraction include many new jobs.187 Take
the historical example of personal computing. Computers caused an estimated 3.5
million lost jobs since 1970, but also created 19.3 million jobs during the same
period, for a net 15.8 million more jobs. 188 Although it’s impossible to know for
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Id. at 48-50 (noting possibility, but concluding that speed and breadth of technological
advancement is not out of line with past periods).
181 In addition to the difficulty in predicting the future, much of the current data on issues related
to technology is sparse and often less than useful. Tyrone Richardson, More Data Needed on Gig
Workers, Senate Appropriators Say, BLOOMBERG LAW DAILY LABOR REPORT, Jul 5., 2018 (also
noting senators’ demands for more information about AI and automation).
182 Manyika, supra note 3.
183 Id., at 3, 28 (predicting range of outcomes depending on speed of automation, with a midpoint
of 15% global labor hours being displaced by 2030; range for U.S. displacement is 3% to 44%).
184 Id., at 14. (noting that adoption of technology in lower range of its estimate could result in
displacement of less than 10 million workers).
185 Id. at 11, 86 (estimating that up to one-third of workers in U.S and Germany will need new
skills, and one-half of workforce in Japan).
186 Id., at 27, 74.
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DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, JOBS OPENINGS AND LABOR TURNOVER
SUMMARY—DECEMBER 2018 (describing monthly hires of 5.9 million and layoffs and discharges of
5.5. million), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.nr0.htm
188 Manyika, supra note 3, at 40-41.
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certain, it is probable that emerging technology will also end up producing job
gains that will outweigh job losses in the long run. 189
Tech-related job gains will likely result from several factors. One driver is
technology’s capacity to enhance or create demand for certain types of work. An
obvious area of this type of job growth is work directly related to technology. For
instance, jobs in the IT industry—only a part of the overall technology industry—
could increase by 20 to 50 million jobs worldwide by 2030.190 In addition, there
will be a growing need for software developers, programmers, systems analysts,
and others who work with increasingly advanced technology. 191 But another major
driver of job growth will be technology’s ability to boost productivity and
spending, thereby expanding the economy and generating increased demand for
labor.192 Overall, the McKinsey report estimates that general growth in the labor
market, as well as an 8%-9% increase in demand for occupations that do not
currently exist, will result in net gains of around 15 million U.S. jobs by 2030.193
However, these estimates do not tell the whole story. A significant number of
workers who remain employed throughout this period will see their jobs change in
some fashion, as technology becomes increasingly integrated with the
workplace.194 And many of these workers will be harmed by the increased reliance
on technology, which could negatively impact wages for years or even decades, 195
especially for those whose skills face lower demand.196 Moreover, even if we see
overall job gains, technology is still likely to produce substantial job losses, which
greatly impact effected workers and the nation as a whole.
Discerning which workers will face job losses or negative consequences
largely hinges on technology’s potential to make certain tasks obsolete for human
workers. Although impossible to predict with certainty, identifying tasks better
suited for automation as opposed those at which humans excel will illustrate the
likely future labor displacement trends.
Among the jobs most at risk are those that entail a significant amount of
predictability and repetitiveness, particularly in controlled environments, as well
as those with severe health and safety risks. 197 Examples include certain types of
manufacturing work, as well jobs that require moving certain objects or even
putting together simple meals. 198 Similarly, basic data collection and processing
will be subject to automation, meaning that workers such as paralegals, office
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Although that does not mean that the same people who suffer job losses will benefit from job
gains. See infra notes 197-203.
190 Id. at 14.
191
Id. at 64.
192 Manyika, supra note 3, at 6-7, 25-31, 65 (estimating that automation could increase annual
global GDP by 0.8% to 1.45%).
193 Id. at 14. However, it is hard to isolate the net effect of technology because some portion of
general labor-market growth is indirectly influenced by technological innovations.
194 Id. at 27 (estimating that 60% of occupations involve at least 30% skills that could be
automated).
195 Id. at 4 (noting that real wages stagnated for decades during England’s Industrial Revolution,
despite substantial productivity gains).
196
Id. at 17 (noting that wage polarization in advanced economics could increase as current highwage jobs grow more, while middle-wage jobs face declines).
197 See supra note 198-199; Manyika, supra note 3, at 16.
198 Manyika, supra note 3, at 9, 78-79.
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support staff, and cashiers will likely see a significant change in their job duties,
major cuts in hours, or a total loss of their jobs.199
In contrast, other jobs will likely remain the province of human workers for
the foreseeable future. The type of work most likely to be buffered from
technological displacement or even see higher demand involve tasks requiring
judgment, ethical or moral considerations, and quick adaptions to unknown
environmental circumstances.200 Similarly, jobs that require expertise, significant
interactions with other humans, and managing or developing workers are less
likely to be automated. 201 Examples of this type of work are as diverse as
professionals like attorneys and physicians; skilled laborers such as gardeners,
carpenters, and plumber; and personal service providers in the child- and healthcare industries.202 But even workers in these jobs will need to gain new skills to
adapt to workplaces that increasingly blend humans and technology. 203
Amazon again provides a good example of the different ways in which
technology will, and will not, change work. The company is known for automating
tasks wherever possible, but this doesn’t mean that the company is simply
replacing workers with machines. 204 Amazon hasn’t released precise figures, but it
claims that its overall workforce is still growing substantially. 205 This trend could
reverse in the future, especially for certain jobs, but up to this point technology
hasn’t caused a net loss of jobs at the company. But this doesn’t mean that workers
are unaffected. Take Amazon’s decision to automate an increasing percentage of
its interactions with vendors who sell and supply merchandise sold on the platform.
Amazon’s analysis showed that its algorithms are better than humans at handling
tedious inventory spreadsheets and more accurately predicting demand for
products.206 This change had a varied impact on workers, some of whom were able
to realign their tasks while remaining at roughly the same jobs, while many left or
changed positions within the company. 207 At Amazon, therefore, technology has
spurred job changes and job losses, which—for now—have been outweighed by
new jobs. But as technology becomes less expensive and more efficient, the risk
to workers is likely to grow. Thus, mitigating the negative effects of technology
will require workers to learn new skills either to keep their current jobs or to seek
alternate positions.208
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Id. at 9, 78-79.
See supra 46.
201 Manyika, supra note 3, at 16, 30.
202 Hauser interview, supra note 114; Manyika, supra note 3, at 6, 102.
203
See supra note 194.
204 Wingfield, supra note 110.
205 Id. (noting that since incorporating a certain type of robot in its warehouses, Amazon added
80,000 warehouse workers in the U.S.)
206 Spencer Soper, Amazon’s Clever Machines Move from Warehouse to Headquarters,
BLOOMBERG LAW DAILY LAB. REP., Jun. 13, 2018.
207 Id.
208 For instance, workers who want positions alongside robots will have to learn new skills, as
interacting with robots is very different than interacting with humans. Schools are beginning to
develop training and education programs to help workers become better qualified to work alongside
robotics
and
other
technology.
Wake
Tech,
Collaborative
Robotics,
https://www.waketech.edu/programs-courses/non-credit/enhance-your-career/advancedmanufacturing/collaborative-robotics.
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2. Possible Responses To Technology’s Impact on the Workplace
The dilemma presented by technology is a serious one. On one hand, if AI,
robotics, and XR follow historical trends, then the overall labor market will remain
strong in the long run and policymakers’ central concern will be to cushion the
harms faced by “losing” workers. On the other hand, if emerging technology
represent a truly new era of work, then there is a risk that it will veer away from
historical trends and ultimately decrease overall employment. The difficulties and
uncertainties involved in addressing that possibility make the substantial
challenges of the traditional outcome seem trivial.
Professor Cynthia Estlund recently explored these and other possible results
of automation in the workplace, arguing that we should seek ways to lower the cost
to businesses of human labor as a means to slow the tide of automation or even
prepare for a world with less work.209 I have doubts about our ability to delay
technological job displacement in any meaningful way, as well as the chance that
we will see a world in which humans work far less while still enjoying comparable
standards of living. Nevertheless, Estlund’s attention to business incentives and
her proposals—which focus, among other things, on detaching the social safety
from the employment relationship—align well with other strategies to ease the
transition to a more blended workplace. 210
Rather than attempting to halt the integration of technology, a better—or at
least additional—path is to prepare workers for the workplace of the future. Given
the nonpecuniary benefits that accompany work, 211 there is much value in
providing workers the tools they need to find quality jobs in a changing
environment. Thus, the foremost goal should be an emphasis on providing
individuals the tools they need to find and keep good jobs. And, ideally, they
should be able to do so in a relatively short time frame, because the longer
displaced workers are without jobs, the more significant the harm to both the
individual and the entire economy. 212 Although a comprehensive strategy to
prepare for the future of work is beyond the scope of this Article, there are some
general approaches that can ease the burden of technological change and better
prepare workers for what lies ahead.
The principal aim should be to ensure that workers have the education and
training to match the jobs of the future. In addition to the practical problems
associated with this goal, predicting the direction that technology will take is
challenging.213 As a result, workers will need flexible skills that allow them to
obtain often unpredictable new job opportunities as old ones disappear. General
education is the key foundation for establishing workers’ flexibility, as automation
and other technology typically leads to greater demand for higher-educated
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Estlund, Automation, supra note 176, at 301.
Id. at 305-314 (citing, for example, health care, family leave, and basic income).
211 Dr. Bette Jacobs et. al., At the Intersection of Health and Justice: How the Health of American
Indians and Alaska Natives Is Disproportionately Affected by Disparities in the Criminal Justice
System, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 41, 58–59 (2018).
212
Manyika, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that if most displaced workers are able to find new work
within a year, the employment rate is likely to remain strong, while a longer period of unemployment
can create overall harm to the economy).
213 See supra notes 182-193 and accompanying text.
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3334667

30

DRAFT

workers, 214 while jobs requiring less education will likely be displaced at a higher
rate.215 Thus, calls in some quarters to transform higher education into a more
trade-based system of education216 is short-sighted and exactly the opposite
strategy of what we should pursue. Instead, we need to deepen our commitment to
providing individuals with a solid, broad educational foundation that will better
equipment them to work in an uncertain future. 217 But we also must find ways to
encourage mid-career workers to seek out training and other opportunities to gain
new skills.218 Improving education and training is difficult, however. Because of
higher job turnover, fewer employers are willing to invest in training. 219
Government entities in the U.S. aren’t much better, especially compared to other
developed economies.220 Accordingly, the government should do far more to assist
workers who want or need to learn new skills. Given the magnitude of job
disruptions likely to result from emerging technology, we could consider a robust
program that emulates the largely successful GI Bill.221
Maintaining fluidity in the labor market—which better enables workers to
switch jobs—will also be important. 222 Measures such as income support or
transitional payments for unemployed workers would both lessen the sting of job
losses and provide workers more time to search for desirable new employment.223
Similarly, we could expand economic adjustment programs to include workers
displaced by technology. The Department of Labor already runs such a program
for workers who lose jobs because of trade, 224 but the program—and others like

214 Manyika, supra note 3, at 15-16, 82-83 (noting also that in advanced economies middle-wage
jobs may face net losses, but net gains in emerging economies).
215 Id. at 30 (estimating that by 2030 the following types of jobs could have this percentage of
tasks automated: 55% of tasks in jobs requiring less than high school (e.g., logging, drivers); 52% in
jobs with high school or some experience (e.g., store clerks, travel agents); 44% in jobs with some
post-secondary (e.g., nursing assistants, legal secretaries); and 22% in jobs with bachelor’s or higher
degrees (e.g., attorneys, doctors).
216 Michael Stoner, Addressing the Decline in Higher Ed’s Reputation, INSIDE H IGHER ED, Feb. 9,
2017.
217 Cf. Manyika, supra note 3, at 107 (noting success of movement to mandate high school
education).
218
Moreover, spending on worker training has been declining or flat in recent years in most
advanced economies. Manyika, supra note 3, at 18.
219 Miller & Bui, supra note 129 (stating that lack of training investment results from employers’
concern that employees may leave and take new skills to competitors, while workers may feel that
investing in training will not result in new job prospects).
220 Id. (noting that U.S. spends far less than other countries on job training and workers). The
White House has made a renewed push for expansion of apprenticeship programs, which has been a
rare public policy initiative garnering bipartisan support. Id. But it remains to be seen whether this
produces real benefits, especially given the narrow scope of most apprenticeship programs.
221 Manyika, supra note 3, at 107 (noting that job training spending has declined since the 1990s
and emphasizing success of GI Bill). Other countries have explored national education and training
programs. OECD, LEARNING FOR JOBS (2010).
222 Manyika, supra note 3, at 114; Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent
System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 364 (2012) (discussing Danish “flexicurity” system).
223 Mike Muro & Joseph Parilla, Maladjusted: It’s Time To Reimagine Economic “Adjustment”
Programs, BROOKINGS : THE AVENUE, Jan. 10, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2017/01/10/maladjusted-its-time-to-reimagine-economic-adjustment-programs/; Estlund,
Automation, supra note 176, at 313-314.
224
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/statutesregs.cfm; see also Muro & Parilla, supra note 223.
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it—generally get poor reviews. 225 A more comprehensive adjustment system,
especially one that provides meaningful assistance to workers forced to adjust to
new jobs or locations, could help workers transition to new jobs. 226 Among the
ways that readjustment efforts could be improved include expanding financial
investment into readjustment efforts; centralize the many, disperse readjustment
programs; and provide readjustment assistance or training benefits to workers
before they lose their jobs, especially in regions, industries, or occupations most
likely to feel technology’s impact.227 Finally, reducing the costs to workers of
switching jobs, such as the current widespread use of non-compete agreements,
could ease the transition to the jobs of the future.228
Another strategy to increase labor fluidity is making benefits like health
coverage more portable so workers are not tied to a specific business. 229 The risk
of immediately losing one’s benefits can be the difference between seeking what
would otherwise be a desirable new opportunity and staying in place, even if the
long-term prospects are grim. 230 Thus, programs that provide benefits that are
independent of employment could reduce or eliminate this lock-in effect. Federal
legislators have taken some recent actions to address this issue, particularly with
regard to gig and other contingent workers, but thus far Congress has passed
nothing.231 However, there does seem to be more bipartisan support for increasing
benefit portability, including among advocates for both businesses and workers, so
there may be hope that some measure is ultimately enacted. 232
Reducing disincentives to seek jobs in new locations is also important, as
geographic areas with strong labor markets today may be different than the ones
in the future. One option is to lower the burden of various licensing and
certification requirements which for certain jobs, like nursing, can vary greatly
among states and dissuade workers from making geographic moves. 233
Additionally, the mere existence of licensing requirements in certain industries,
especially those dominated by low-wage jobs, have come under question as they

225

Muro & Parilla, supra note 223; David H. Autor et al., Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level
Evidence, 129 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 1799, 1804, 1832-33 (2014) (finding that displaced workers
rely on other benefits—primarily Social Security and Medicare—rather than trade adjustment
retraining).
226 For instance, we could provide relocation grants to help workers move away from areas with
fewer jobs to those with more opportunities. Muro & Parilla, supra note 223.
227 Muro & Parilla, supra note 223 (advocating comprehensive basic set of readjustment benefits
and assistance).
228 Stone, Widgets to Digits, supra note 1, at 127-156.
229 Estlund, Automation, supra note 176, at 306-308 (advocating detaching benefits from
employment relationship as means of lowering cost of human labor and reducing incentive to
automate work).
230 John Ahlquist, The Future of Work: Risk Bearing and Risk Sharing, PACIFIC S TANDARD (Sept.
3,
2015),
https://psmag.com/economics/the-future-of-work-risk-bearing-and-risksharing#.k79d8ylye.
231 For instance, the Portable Benefits for Independent Workers Pilot Program Act, S. 1251, 115th
Cong. (2017), would examine tax issues related to gig work and provide grants to explore portable
benefit programs for gig workers and independent contractors.
232 Tyrone Richardson, Gig Bills May be in the Works after Labor Department Report,
BLOOMBERG LAW DAILY LAB. REP., May 2, 2018.
233 Recent federal efforts have attempted to encourage states to address this issue, but such efforts
have been limited. Gayle Cinquegrani, You Can’t Take it with You: State Licensing Creates Job
Barriers, BLOOMBERG LAW, Aug. 24, 2018.
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create significant barriers to employment with questionable benefits.234 Other
strategies, such as promoting more affordable housing options, could make
workers more open to moving.235
In addition to the foregoing options, policymakers could increase labor fluidity
by implementing more job counseling for workers who are displaced or at a risk
of losing their jobs;236 providing grants to allow workers to take time off from work
to take classes;237 and creating more effective job-matching resources. 238 Other,
more controversial, recommendations might also include implementing a higher
minimum wage, basic minimum income, or other financial support.239 Technology,
perhaps ironically, could also assist with some of these efforts, such as VR
providing opportunities for work located in different geographic areas. Moreover,
platform and other gig work provide some needed fluidity to the labor market,
allowing firms and workers to more efficiently match up in a rapidly changing
economy.240 However, this type of work also highlights the risks of technology as
it emerges in our current, inadequate workplace regulatory system. For reasons
explained in the next section, gig workers are largely at the mercy of firms and
technology threatens to expose many other workers to a similarly toxic mix of low
job security, lack of bargaining power, and constant monitoring and control.
None of these strategies are a panacea, even if there was the political will to
implement any time soon (which I very much doubt). Yet, the potential magnitude
of technology’s impact on the workplace may be so great that policymakers cannot
ignore these issues. Whether they react in a manner that is either timely or
sufficient remains to be seen. But the hope is that, perhaps more than any previous
challenges, the threat of technology spurs much needed changes in workplace law.
B. Worker Classification: Who is an Employee in the Future Economy?
Among the many groups of workers who are at risk of being harmed by
emerging technology, none face a more dire outlook than those who are not
classified as statutory employees. Workers who are classified as independent
contractors or other non-employees are completely excluded from coverage by
workplace laws—they have no guaranteed minimum wage, no protection for safety
and health, no family and medical leave, no right to organize, no disability
accommodations, and no right to be free from discrimination. 241 This is not a new
problem by any means; even in the initial days of the earliest workplace legislation,
employers attempted to exclude workers by classifying them as independent

234 Id. (describing substantial costs of some licenses, some states that have eliminated some
requirement, and 2018 federal legislation that encourages states to address this issue).
235
David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why We Should Become Un-Stuck!, 127 YALE L.J.
FORUM 571, 587-88 (2017).
236 Muro & Parilla, supra note 223.
237 Id.
238 Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information Exchange
Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 88-89 (2016).
239 Estlund, Automation, supra note 176, at 313-314 (discussing options as means to lower
financial burdens on employers).
240 Manyika, supra note 3, at 19 (noting Germany’s unemployment agency’s new focus on jobmatching).
241 Jacquie Lee, Gig Workers Have Scant Protection from Job Bias, B LOOMBERG L AW, Feb. 9,
2019 (describing concern of EEOC and others about gig workers’ lack of protection against
discrimination).
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contractors.242 But technology has exacerbated this problem, as gig and other “on
demand” workers are often an ill-fit with the traditional employee classification
analysis.243
Workers in these new, tech-dependent industries have discovered that current
workplace laws, most of which are many decades old, are based on the workplace
of the early- to mid-20th Century, a workplace where workers’ status was usually
clear.244 To a much greater degree than their predecessors, gig and other workers
in tech-related industries lack a physical workplace, possess flexibility in their
hours and means of work, and encounter highly variable terms and conditions of
work—all of which are important factors in the traditional employee classification
tests.245 Indeed, individuals are increasingly engaging in “virtual work” that
challenges our conception of work itself. 246
In recent decades we have already seen an increase in companies’ willingness
to classify workers as independent contractors excluded from workplace
protections.247 This growth has been particularly evident in tech-related industries;
for instance, in 2016, almost a tenth of respondents in a survey reported
participating in the platform economy. 248 But this increase in participation has been
accompanied by a decrease in earnings, as another study found that workers who
used apps to provide transportation services—such as Lyft or Uber Eats—saw their

For instance, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (holding
that “newsboys” were employees under the NLRA), led Congress to amend the NLRA to specifically
exclude independent contractors, 20 U.S.C. § 152(3).
243 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (stating that trying to apply
the law to on-demand workers is like being “handed a square peg and asked to choose between two
round holes”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1739-1745 (2018) (describing challenges faced by gig and other contingent
workers, particularly Uber drivers).
244 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081 (“The test . . . developed over the 20th Century for classifying
workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem.”).
245 Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 243, at 1744. On the other hand, if the enhanced monitoring
discussed in Section II.C leads to companies’ exerting more control over how workers do their jobs,
that would increase the chances of an “employee” classification. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 518 (1992) (establishing common-law “right-to-control” test used for most
workplace laws); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing “economic
realities” test used for FLSA and FMLA claims).
246 Professor Miriam Cherry has written extensively about virtual work, such as online
crowdsourcing; the challenges it presents to our preexisting employment law doctrine; and the
vulnerabilities of individuals who engage in it. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual
Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011); Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 471 (2010); Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying
the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077 (2009).
247
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-859T, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION :
IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 2 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07859t.pdf. In addition to avoiding labor and employment law
liability, companies also gain significant tax advantages by using independent contractors rather than
employees. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Tax Issues in the Sharing Economy: Implications for
Workers, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY (Nestor M. Davidson,
Michele Finck & John J. Infranca, eds. forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3167464; Kathleen
DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415 (2018); Katherine V.W. Stone,
Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and
Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 279 (2006).
248 Pew Research Center, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing, Nov. 17, 2016 (finding
8% using platform economy for job or task, 18% selling something, and 1% renting out property),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing/.
242
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monthly income from this work decrease 53% from 2013 to 2017.249 And because
most of these workers are classified as independent contractors, wage and hour
laws don’t help.
The most publicized example of this phenomenon is Uber which, like most
platform companies, insists that its drivers are independent contractors rather than
employees. This stance has prompted a litany of litigation under both state and
federal law.250 It has also prompted innovative approaches to improving drivers’
working conditions, including an unofficial drivers’ union251 and municipal actions
attempting to provide drivers’ the ability to officially unionize. 252 But these
alternative measures, while beneficial, mask the reality that gig and many other
workers lack any meaningful legal protection. Most of these individuals,
particularly those who work for smaller, lower-profile companies or otherwise face
insurmountable collective-action problems, will have no opportunity to take
advantage of alternative half-measures. Thus, absent legislative or judicial action,
these workers’ fate are largely left to companies’ unilateral whim.253
But what actions should or could policymakers take? There are no shortage of
recommendations. These include additional penalties against employers who
misclassify their employees; 254 expanding the current employee-classification
tests;255 creating a third classification, such as “dependent contractors” who receive
a portion of the rights to which statutory employees are entitled; 256 and even
abandoning employment law approaches entirely and, instead, regulate platform

249 The Online Platform Economy in 2018, JPMorgan Chase (2018) (finding monthly income drop
from $1,469 to $783, although study did not measure hours worked and found little change in nontransportation earnings), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/report-ope-2018.htm.
250 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding, in
denial of summary judgment for Uber, that drivers were presumptively employees under California
Labor Code; parties subsequently settled); Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 243, at 1743 (noting
employee classification cases brought against numerous technology companies); Miriam A.
Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y
J. 577, 579-594 (2016) (describing employee classification cases against “on demand” companies).
251 Hirsch & Seiner, supra note 243, at 1749-1753 (describing the Uber Guild and noting ways
that technology has helped some of these efforts).
252
Charlotte Garden, The Seattle Solution: Collective Bargaining by For-Hire Drivers and
Prospects for Pro-Labor Federalism, __ H ARVARD LAW & POL’Y REV. __ (forthcoming) (describing
Seattle ordinance), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3137308.
253 The labor market, particularly in times of high employment, can prompt better working
conditions. However, we are currently seeing compensation for gig work decline during a period of
historically low unemployment, supra note 249, and conditions are likely to worsen as technology
begins to replace human workers.
254
Payroll Fraud Prevention Act, H.R. 3629, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending FLSA to address
misclassification).
255 Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, ”Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635 (2017) (proposing that gig workers be classified as
employees as default, with some exceptions); Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the
Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 750 (1995) (advocating test centered on
workers’ economic dependence on business; Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57, 6263 (2005) (arguing for intermediate category of employees based on their dependence and
subordination to a business).
256
St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 486 (2005) (Member Liebman, dissenting) (noting
classification in Sweden, Canada, and Germany); Cherry & Aloisi, Dependent Contractors, supra
note 255 (examining intermediate category used in different countries); MARC LINDER, THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 240 (1989).
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work via the Federal Trade Commission. 257 We could also amend the tax laws to
reduce the incentive of businesses to classify workers as independent
contractors.258 A broader, albeit politically improbable, approach could expand
certain workplace protections, such as minimum wage and safety, to all individuals
who perform work. 259 The argument for this approach is that no one, even those
who are truly independent contractors, should have to work for less than $7.25 an
hour 260 or be subjected to unsafe working conditions. Therefore, entities that
control pay or the work environment would be required to do so at a minimally
acceptable level.
Despite widespread recognition that misclassification is a significant problem,
and not just in the tech sector, legislative response has been tepid. Some states have
considered bills to ensure that gig and other similarly situated workers are
classified as employees.261 But, in part because of the power of businesses interests,
more states have been pursuing the opposite aim by trying to ensure that these
workers are classified as independent contractors. 262 Such efforts are short-sighted,
as they trade near-term business interests for the long-term social costs that are
associated with a growing percentage of individuals who are dependent on
insecure, unpredictable, and low-wage work.
Although the way forward is not obvious, what is clear is that gig and other
similarly situated workers’ situation is untenable. They exist in a modern economy
that is governed as if the last half-century never occurred, much less one that is
undergoing rapid changes prompted by technology. In this emerging economy,
many workers will continue to rely on a patchwork of gigs that, unless something
is done, will leave them in the gaps of our workplace regulatory system. To provide
these workers the protections that we have deemed essential for employees, we
must alter our approach to workplace regulation and—as is the case for addressing
job displacement—consider changes to the social safety net.263 Neither will be easy
or even feasible in the near-term, but the changes generated by emerging
technology may prove to be the tipping point. 264

257 Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Workers in the Gig Economy: Look to the FTC, 51
INDIANA L. REV. 377 (2018).
258 See supra note 247.
259 For instance, legislation could mirror Section 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in
contractual relationships. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Lee, supra note 241. Cf. Brishen Rogers, Toward ThirdParty Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010) (arguing for liability under
FLSA to rely on a firm’s duty of reasonable care to ensure compliance throughout its supply chain,
rather than workers’ status as employees of firm); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent
Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory
Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 187, 223 (1999) (arguing for employment relationship
to cover service provider and recipient).
260
This minimum wage could be made more flexible by taking into account other forms of
compensation, such as the value of other goods or services exchanged for the work.
261 S. Bill 18-171 (Colo. 2018). The California Supreme Court also recently changed its test for
employee classification; the new test applies generally, but should make it easier for gig workers to
argue that they are employees. Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018)
(adopting “ABC” classification test).
262 Describing efforts by Handy, a platform housecleaning company, to convince state legislators
to adopt sample legislation that would classify platform workers as independent contractors; three
states have already enacted such legislation, and at least five more are considering it. Sarah Kessler,
Handy is Quietly Lobbying State Lawmakers to Declare Its Workers aren’t Employees, QUARTZ,
Mar. 30, 2018.
263 See supra notes 229-232.
264 See supra notes 252, 261.
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C. Employer Monitoring and Worker Privacy:
Working In A Fishbowl
Among today’s emerging technologies, perhaps none are as currently
underappreciated by policymakers as those that enhance employers’ ability to
monitor workers and limit their autonomy. Employers have always desired
information about the quality and effort of workers, as well as more personal
information, and they have frequently used emerging technologies to obtain it.265
But past advances like the time clock and aptitude tests pale in comparison to what
is already occurring now, which in turn is a far cry from what is on the horizon.266
Many employers are already monitoring workers extensively in an attempt to
crack down on shirking, protect trade secrets, stop harassment, and other
reasons.267 The existing levels of workplace monitoring are quite alarming, but
new innovations will become progressively integrated into a blended workplace
which will provide employers with far more dramatic opportunities to watch and
control workers.
Among today’s more accessible monitoring technology are computer and
smart phone programs that allow companies to scrutinize workers’ productivity
and actions, as well as communicate with workers even when they are off-duty.268
Additionally, these devices and other types of equipment with GPS capabilities
provide employers with cost-effective means to track workers’ locations—many
times when they are not at work.269 These capabilities will strike most as familiar,
if not desirable; however, developing technology will allow employers to monitor
workers in ways that make GPS seem quaint.
One company has developed a work badge that tracks not only workers’
movements, but also captures and allows analysis of the tone and length of
workplace conversations. 270 This data can be used to monitor things such as how
often workers talk to individuals of a particular sex, how long they spend listening
versus talking, how much they move around in a day, and what spaces in a building
are used and when. 271 Moreover, in 2017, one Wisconsin company held a “chip
party,” during which employees voluntarily had radio-frequency identification

265 Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica Roberts, The Future of Genetic Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. __
(forthcoming 2019), manuscript at 47-48, http://ssrn.com/abstract=3214163.
266 William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking
Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 409, 455 (2006).
267 Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 C HI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 913
(2012).
268 Ajunwa et al., supra note 12, at 742-744, 771-772 (describing recent employer monitoring
practices, including productivity apps).
269 David Kravets, Worker Fired for Disabling GPS App that Tracked Her 24 Hours a Day, ARS
TECHNICA May 11, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/worker-fired-for-disablinggps-app-that-tracked-her-24-hours-a-day; see also Arias v. Intermex Wire Transfer, LLC, No. 1:15CV-01101 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (settlement of claims by employee allegedly fired for turning
off employer’s GPS-capturing app when off-duty).
270 Reiece, supra note 279; Smile, You’re on Camera: There Will be Little Privacy in the
Workplace of the Future, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 2018 (describing employer that requires workers
to wear devices with a microphone and motion tracker and uses information as part of its people
analytics).
271 Id.
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(RFID) chips implanted in their forearms.272 These chips were ostensibly intended
to make purchases in a break room, open locked doors, log in to computers, and
access other types of equipment. 273 However, employers could, under the U.S.’s
default “employment-at-will” rule,274 require workers to submit to embedded
technology or other monitoring devices.
Emerging monitoring technology promises even greater intrusions. For
instance, one device under development can track not only where workers are
positioned at a given time, but also what their hands are doing. 275 Other devices
will help control the amount of time workers spend on tasks, including going to
the bathroom.276 In Japan, technology is already in use that measures employees’
breathing and can shoot blasts of air to wake them up. 277
As significant as these advances seem, far more disruptive monitoring
applications are on the horizon. In particular, the encroachment of other types of
technologies into the workplace will greatly expand employers’ monitoring
capabilities. Consider automation or XR in a blended workplace. Both
technologies employ a substantial amount of image capturing, much more than
what is occurring now. Companies can aggregate this data with AI systems to delve
into highly intimate areas. For instance, by marrying AI with monitoring
technology that captures biometric and other subtle behavioral cues employers will
be able to predict workers’ moods, energy levels, and whether they are likely to
engage in certain behaviors, as well as even diagnose depression or other medical
conditions.278 “Wearables” are an early harbinger of this potential, as employers
have begun exploring the use of Fitbits and other devices that can monitor workers’
movements, level of exertion, posture, stress levels, fatigue, and other personal
details.279 In short, the integration of technologies like automation, AI, and XR into
the workplace will make these intrusive practices cheaper and easier to implement,
while spurring novel ways to monitor and control workers.
If one doubts whether employers will take advantage of the ability to intrude
into the most private aspects of workers’ lives, consider the National Football
League’s (NFL) vaunted “combine.” At this annual event, teams evaluate former
collegiate players who hope to join the NFL. During the combine, teams use
various technologies to evaluate not only players’ current and predicted athletic
performance, but also highly personal physiological and mental health

272 Joseph Jerome, Embedded Chip On Your Shoulder? Some Privacy and Security
Considerations, IAPP PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 1, 2017 (arguing that employers should clearly
disclose their purposes for embedded chips and limitations on the use of information gathered).
273 Id.
274
See infra note 341.
275 Ceylan Yeginsu, A Wristband to Track Workers’ Hand Movements? (Amazon has Patents for
It), SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 1, 2018.
276 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Platforms and Wearable
Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment and Labor Law, 63 ST.
LOUIS L.J __ (forthcoming 2019) (discussing Amazon patents), manuscript at 18-19,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247286.
277 Marco Buscaglia, Locked and Uploaded: Employers Use Wearable Devices to Monitor, Learn
More About Their Workers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 25, 2018.
278
Smile, You’re on Camera, supra note 270; Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big
Data to Track Employee Pregnancies, FORTUNE, Feb. 17, 2016.
279 Richard Reice, Wearables in the Workplace: A New Frontier, B LOOMBERG L AW, May 24, 2018
(noting that by 2018 employers had used 13 million fitness trackers in company wellness programs).
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information.280 To be sure, the amount of money at stake for these high-paid
employees is unusual, but as the affordability and effectiveness of monitoring
technology increases, the number of employers that take advantage of these
capabilities will rise as well. Indeed, if employers remain able to sell personal
information about their workers, we should expect this development to expand
rapidly.281
The future workplace’s amalgam of technology and human workers will
provide employers the capacity to monitor workers 24-hours a day and use that
data to access intimate information. However, despite these looming horrors, it is
worth noting that technology can also benefit workers. Some innovations will
make work safer by tracking workers’ hydration levels, posture, and fatigue;
identifying workplace hazards; and, in an example of a merger between automation
and monitoring technology, lowering the risk of injury by helping workers lift
objects with exoskeletons and other robotic technology. 282 Uber has experimented
with analyzing drivers’ acceleration and braking data to identify unsafe driving
practices.283 And employers worried about liability for sexual harassment will be
tempted to increase monitoring of employees,284 while wearables and other devices
could, if used correctly, reduce wage and hour violations.285 But all of those
innovations still raise serious privacy questions, as they typically capture a large
amount of personal data and can be used to shape workers’ behavior, even at
home.286
Existing privacy laws in the U.S. are woefully inadequate even for current
technology, much less the technology of tomorrow. Indeed, with a few limited
exceptions, workplace privacy protections are essentially nonexistent in the private
sector.287 As briefly described below, there are a few laws that might provide
safeguards in limited instances, but for the most part, the privacy interests of
private-sector workers are left to the whims of their employers. 288 Public-sector
employees have a layer of protection against some privacy invasions that qualify

Rick Mease, The NFL Combine: Pro Football’s Intrusive and Compulsory, Job Interview,
WASH. POST., Feb. 26, 2017 (describing tests including heart and blood testing, X-rays, MRIs,
psychological exams, drug testing, neurological testing, cognitive and intelligence exams—some of
which is available to potential employers in less than a minute after the test is performed); Dave
Siebert, An Inside Look Into the NFL Medial Exam Process at the Combine, BLEACHER REPORT, Feb.
21, 2014 (same, also noting stress tests, orthopedic exams, and evaluation of internal organs and preexisting conditions).
281 Cf. Jennifer Valentino DeVries et al., Your Apps Knowns Where You Were Last Night, and
They’re Not Keeping it Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2018 (describing companies’ capturing and
selling of smart phone users’ locations).
282
Reiece, supra note 279; Ajunwa, supra note 276, at 21, 25-26; Smile, You’re on Camera, supra
note 270.
283 Schreiber, Uber, supra note 49.
284 Ajunwa, supra note 276, at 16-18, 37.
285 Clement L. Tsao et al., The Rise of Wearable and Smart Technology in the Workplace, ABA
NAT’L S YMP. ON TECH. IN LAB. & EMP. L. 4 (2017).
286 Moreover, technology, especially when new and unfamiliar, could lead to accidents and other
harms. See supra note 108.
287 Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 988-989.
288
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (no right to privacy in private sector); Ajunwa
et al., supra note 12, at 749. Unionized employees may gain additional privacy protections via
collective-bargaining agreements, but like other specialized employment contracts, those agreements
require employers’ assent.
280
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as searches under the Fourth Amendment. 289 However, even if public employers
engage in such searches they will not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if they
were motivated by a valid business justification or a court finds that the affected
employees lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. 290
When employers collect or use their workers’ health-related information—like
at the NFL combine—the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)291 or Genetic
Information Non-Discrimination Act 292 (GINA) might provide some protection.293
But those laws protect only disabled employees and genetic information
respectively. In other words, if a worker is not classified as an employee294 or an
employee is not disabled, the ADA is irrelevant, while GINA does nothing to
protect against intrusions that do not involve genetic information. Thus, companies
can work around both of those statutes with relative ease, permitting for example
an employer to evaluate all of its non-disabled workers or applicants based on nongenetic personal characteristics and other intimate information. And even when
those statutes are applicable, they have limited reach. During the hiring process,
the ADA mainly prohibits disability related questions or medical examinations of
job applicants.295 Once an offer of employment is made, employers are generally
free to access health records or similar medical information as long as it is
necessary for the business and it is not used to discriminate based on an applicant’s
or employee’s disability.296 However, the ADA does not appear to protect medicalrelated information that employers gather from other sources, such as emerging
monitoring technology.297
Various privacy laws suggest some protection against monitoring, but they
apply in such limited circumstances that they are virtually useless for workers. For
instance, the Wiretap Act—as codified under the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA)—regulates the intercept of electronic, oral, and wire
communications, but not GPS or other types of monitoring. 298 The Wiretap Act
also prohibits only the simultaneous intercept of electronic communications,
meaning that employers are able capture emails, texts, or other communications

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987). Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 201 L. Ed.
2d 507 (2018) (holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain warrant before retrieving
cell-site location information); United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that police
needed warrant to place GPS tracker on suspect’s car).
290 NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 149–50 (2011); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756–
57 (2010).
291 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
292 Id. §§ 2000ff-2000ff-11.
293 Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 995-996 (discussing possibility that forcing employees to submit
to psychological testing not justified by valid business need might violate employees’ common-law
privacy rights).
294 See supra Section II.B.
295 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
296 Id. § 12112(d)(3), (d)(4) (permitting information if it’s job-related and business necessity);
Areheart & Roberts, supra note 265, at 55-56.
297 Areheart & Roberts, supra note 265, at 56. Relatedly, the EEOC recently stated that employers
could lawfully collect medical-related information as part of wellness programs, as long as employee
participation in the program was truly voluntary and the data was disclosed only in aggregate form
that does not identify individuals. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) suffers from
the same shortcomings, as it protects only medical records and applies only to health care providers,
plans, and similar entities—not employers. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 163.
298 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
289
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and analyze them later.299 The Stored Communications Act (SCA), which is also
part of the ECPA, partially fills this gap through its coverage of stored electronic
communications.300 But the SCA’s ability to protect workers is severely limited.
Among other things, the SCA allows employers to insist that workers authorize
access to covered communications, 301 completely neutering the law as it applies to
the workplace. And even without workers’ consent, employers are allowed to
monitor employees’ communications for legitimate business purposes if the
employer provides the service being monitored.302 Similarly, merely giving notice
of monitoring may be enough to avoid liability under the SCA, which only applies
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 303 Most state eavesdropping
laws suffer from the same limitations, including employers’ ability to condition
jobs on workers’ consent to monitoring.304 The same is true of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA), 305 which prohibits unauthorized access of a computer, but
only when that access causes a loss of at least $5000 in one year. 306 The CFAA
also covers only certain types of information, such as financial records,
information used for fraud, computer passwords, and information protected by
certain other laws or policies. 307 Moreover, none of these statutes protect workers’
personal data generated through employer monitoring, data mining, or other
emerging technology.
More general workplace legislation might provide some privacy protections in
limited circumstances. For instance, if collected information is used in a
discriminatory fashion, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act could provide a cause of
action.308 Additionally, if an employer uses technology to monitor employees
while they are engaging in activity protected by the National Labor Relations
Act—for instance, planning a drive for a union or collectively agitating for higher
wages—then such surveillance would be unlawful.309 However, the agency in
charge of enforcing that statute is still struggling to regulate email, so the prospects
for it to meaningfully address newer technology is not good.310 In short, these and
other workplace laws do not directly speak to workplace privacy and, as a result,
will be relevant only in limited circumstances.

299 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Wiretap
Act applies only when someone intercepts communications as they are occurring).
300 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2710; 45 C.F.R. § 160.
301 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2); Konop, 302 F.3d at 879-80.
302 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1); Life Insurance Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. 2002).
303 Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18863 (D. Or. 2004). Compare
Cunningham v. New York State Department of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013) (holding that
public employer’s installation of GPS tracker on employee’s personal vehicle was unlawful search),
with El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (approving municipal requirement for
GPS tracking of personally owned taxis).
304 All states have legislation that prohibits eavesdropping, which might apply to employers. Sally
Brown Richardson, Privacy and Community Property, 95 N.C. L. REV. 729, 735 (2017).
305 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
306 Id. §§ 1030(a)(5), 1030(a)(2)(C) (permitting employers to insist on workers’ consent or to
freely access company-supplied equipment).
307 Id. § 1030(a).
308 See infra Section II.C.
309
Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1064-65 (2014).
310 NLRB, Board Invites Briefs Regarding Employee Use of Employer Email, Aug. 1, 2018,
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-invites-briefs-regarding-employee-useemployer-email.
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Given the lack of federal privacy protections, states may provide an
alternative. Predictably, however, state laws are quite varied and none have the
sort of broad-based privacy protection that both current and future technology
warrant.311 That said, unlike the federal government, several states have been
incrementally exploring certain aspects of workplace privacy, such as protecting
employees’ personal social media accounts.312 Although quite limited, one positive
aspect of these social media laws is that—unlike other privacy laws—they
generally prohibit an employer from pressuring employees to give up their
passwords.313 Some states, spurred by the rise in wearable devices, have begun to
address other privacy intrusions. Connecticut and Delaware, for instance, now
require notification if employers collect information about employees’ activities
and conversations other than by direct observation in the workplace.314 A few states
require employee consent before employers can track workplace equipment, like
trucks.315 However, other state attempts to limit tracking equipment do not extend
to employer-owned vehicles and other equipment. 316 A few states have also
prohibited employers from requiring employees to implant RFID devices
including, unsurprisingly, Wisconsin. 317 And still others regulate the collection,
storage, and use of biometric data.318
States also recognize common-law claims for privacy intrusions, although they
are typically limited to only highly offensive invasions into areas over which
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy—a high bar that excludes
most workplaces.319 Indeed, to the extent that employees have any common-law
privacy interests, they are generally nullified by employers’ implementation of
policies that make clear that employees forgo those interests when using employer-

311

RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 7.01–7.06; Ajunwa et al., supra note 12, at 758-762
(surveying state workplace privacy protections, that largely do only three things: regulate audio only,
protect against video in private space; and require notice).
312 Approximately half the states regulate employers’ ability to demand access to employees’ or
applicants’ social media accounts. Robert Sprague, The Piper Lecture: Survey of (Mostly Outdated
and Often Ineffective) Laws Affecting Work- Related Monitoring, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 243
(2018).
313 Nat’l Conf. State Legislators, State Social Media Privacy Laws, Jan. 2, 2018,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-lawsprohibiting-access-to-social-media- usernames-and-passwords.aspx.
314 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-48b; Del. Code § 19-7-705. But see Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 2007
Conn. Super. LEXIS 3446 (Conn. Super. 2007) (holding that company-owned vehicle is part of the
employer’s “premises” and can therefore be outfitted with GPS tracking, even without employees’
knowledge).
315 See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 637.7. Some bills in Congress, like the Location Privacy Protection
Act, S. 2171, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), and the Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R.
1062, 115th Cong. (2017-2018), would accomplish much the same, but have yet to gain much
traction.
316 Sprague, supra note 312, at 245.
317 Kelsi Loos, Maryland Lawmaker Takes Aim at Mandatory Microchipping, GOVERNMENT
TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 15, 2018 (noting prohibitions in California, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and Wisconsin).
318 Erin Marine, Biometric Privacy Laws: Illinois and the Fight Against Intrusive Tech, FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. BLOG, Mar, 20, 2018, https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/03/20/biometricprivacy-laws-illinois-and-the-fight-against-intrusive-tech/; Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric
Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois Cousin, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 18, 2017.
319 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B; RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT L AW § 7.01;
Ajunwa et al., supra note 12, at 748; Sprague, supra note 312, at 225.
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owned computers and other equipment. 320 That said, in extreme cases, courts may
recognize a violation of privacy that results from an employer’s surreptitious
monitoring of sensitive employee information.321
These privacy laws mirror the shortcoming of our workplace regulatory system
as a whole: a patchwork of federal and state legislation that leave huge gaps in
protection for a large swath of workers under numerous legal situations. Strategies
to address these problems are similar as well. Continuing to reactively address
issues once they become serious enough to demand policymakers’ attention may
be a good tactic if you’re playing whack-a-mole, but it is not sufficient to tackle
the myriad issues that affect workers across the economy. This is especially true
when the workplace is undergoing the drastic technological changes that are
underway.
The depth and breadth of monitoring technology warrants a policy response of
similar scope. Ideally, this response would involve a broad federal privacy statute
that protects workers, either as a primary or ancillary goal. Up to now, privacy
laws have either been broad, while exempting workers from most protections, 322
or been focused on very narrow issues, like employers demanding employees’
social media passwords.323 But this approach will continue to leave workers largely
at the mercy of employers’ voluntary privacy practices.
The specifics of any future privacy legislation is beyond the purview of this
Article, but I will note some general approaches worth pursuing. One is a general
privacy statute that is not limited to the workplace, which might be more politically
feasible. A robust privacy law that was sensitive to some of the unique issues
related to the workplace324 would a long way to protect workers. Indeed, calls for
such legislation have been rising throughout the world, 325 although thus far with
little success. However, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)326 provides an admittedly flawed model of such comprehensive privacy
legislation.
The GDPR is responsible for the millions of emails sent across the world in
2018 to notify users of online companies’ privacy policies. Although the GDPR
provides some meaningful notice requirements and protections for the use and
collection of personal data, 327 those protections are fairly modest compared to the
expanding potential of monitoring technology. Moreover, its relevancy to the

320 TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Elizabeth
C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, __ MINN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming)
(discussing computer use policies), manuscript at 51-52, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170764.
321 For instance, in Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995), an employer reviewed
the credit card receipts of an employee, who worked in the employers’ credit card department and
was allowed to use a company card for personal reasons, to determine if he was abusing sick leave.
A jury found that this conduct was a tortious invasion of privacy.
322 See supra notes 298-308
323 See supra note 312.
324 See infra notes 341-342.
325 Arjun Kharpal, Google’s Top Policy Chief Calls for “Common Rules of the Road” Globally
for Tech Regulation, CNBC, Feb. 10, 2019.
326 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 99, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 87 (EU).
327
In 2019, a French agency issued an almost $57 million GDPR fine against Google for failing
to fully disclose to users how the company collected and used personal information, and for failing
to obtain consent to show personalized ads. Tony Romm, France Fines Google Nearly $57 Million
for First Major Violation of New European Privacy Regime, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2019.
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workplace is extremely limited. In particular, the GDPR allows the use of personal
data for “legitimate interests,” which appear to cover most valid business
concerns.328 The GDPR also allows waiver of its privacy rights, although it is an
open question whether an employer can lawfully pressure an employee to consent
under the statute. 329 That said, the general approach of GDPR—a statute that
broadly protects certain types of personal information in many different
situations—is not only more realistic politically than workplace-focused
legislation, but can also ensure that all workers are covered, regardless of their
employee classification.330
If the U.S. were to enact a broad privacy statute, it must define both the type
of information being protected and exceptions, as some forms of monitoring will
be justified, such as rooting out illegal activity.331 There is general agreement,
however, that basic privacy rights require some level of freedom from regular,
unjustified monitoring. 332 But implementing that goal is easier said than done
because it requires the identification of the types of personal information that
should be entitled to protection and the types that should be excluded. Reasonable
minds can differ on this question, but information such as the medical and genetic
data that is partly covered by the ADA and GINA is a good starting point. 333
Similarly, a general privacy statute could also prohibit the collection and use of
data to make predictions or diagnoses of medical conditions or traits.334 A closer
call would be the use of such information to predict employment-related attributes,
such as workers’ propensity to follow rules, work hard, and other conduct that isn’t
strictly medical in nature. 335 Off-duty conduct might be another fault line.
Although American law currently does virtually nothing to protect the off-duty
conduct of private-sector employees, 336 a new privacy statute should consider

328

See supra note 326.
Id.
330 But see Ajunwa et al., supra note 12, at 774 (criticizing broad privacy legislation as failing to
provide protections tailored to specific types of data).
331 Alex Horton, Kellyanne Conway Said Finding Leakers is Easier That Leakers Think. She May
be Right, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2017 (describing how cloud-based software and analytics can sift
through digital information to narrow sets of employees who potential leaked information).
332 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 12. H ARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905, 1917-1918 (2014).
333
GINA’s impact has been limited, with no successful discrimination claims in the ten years
since its enactment; it has instead mainly served as a barrier against unlawful requests for genetic
information. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 265. However, Professors Areheart and Roberts argue
that GINA could serve as a blueprint for a broader privacy legislation. For instance, GINA’s
prohibition on acquiring and using genetic information could be applied to information relevant to
anti-discrimination laws or could serve as a template for bans on the use of certain employment data,
such as employees’ off-duty activity, health, or other personal information. Id. at 63-64. The
Affordable Care Act provides similar, albeit somewhat broader, protection by prohibiting
discrimination based on an individual’s health status. Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the Future
of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, HASTINGS CTR. RT. 5 (May-June 2018).
334 See supra note 169.
335 See, e.g., OECD, OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data (2013) (recommending basic principles for the collection and use of private
data); FED. TRADE COMM’N, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress 7-10 (1998) (setting forth “Fair
Information Practice Principles”: notice/awareness; choice/consent; access/participation;
integrity/security; and enforcement/redress); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
1125, 1170 (2015) (proposing method for determining types of sensitive information, such as many
types of health, education, sexual information).
336 In contrast, countries like France and Germany have begun to regulate employers’ ability to
demand access to off-duty employees. See generally Paul M. Secunda, The Employee Right to
329
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restrictions on employers’ ability to collect information from employees when
they’re away from work.337 In addition, any legislation that is to provide
meaningful protection for workers must prohibit or limit employers’ ability to
demand that workers waive their privacy rights.338 Additionally, any work-related
exceptions should be narrowly focused on genuine business needs.339 Finally,
procedural requirements such as notifying employees before certain information is
collected and used could mitigate some privacy concerns. 340
A still broader approach would be to enact a just-cause termination law that
would require a legitimate business justification for firing workers. Because all but
one state in the U.S. uses at-will employment as the default, “consent” means
almost nothing for the majority of workers who do not have contractual or statutory
job-security protections. 341 Employers can lawfully demand consent from these
workers as a prerequisite for their jobs. Therefore, establishing a national justcause default, as exists in some form in virtually every other country,342 would go
far in removing the problem with consent. If a refusal to waive privacy rights is
not considered “just cause,” employers would need to entice workers with
something more than continued employment to secure privacy waivers. But this is
not an insignificant “if.” Just-cause protection by itself will fail to protect against
the many privacy intrusions that employers could characterize as fulfilling valid
business goals.343 More specific regulation is needed to address those situations,
such as making any workplace privacy protections nonwaivable in most instances.
Although some of these options, such as just-cause legislation, may be
unattainable in the current political climate, I am optimistic that we will see some
attempt to regulate privacy in the near future. In part because of the immediacy of
this issue, as well as its significance to a large and diverse set of people, it is likely
that the chorus for privacy regulation will continue to grow. Indeed, we have
already witnessed enough public concern that even the tech industry has indicated
some openness to federal privacy legislation. 344 As a result, I expect a legislative
response at some point; the question is whether such legislation will be
comprehensive enough to adequately address companies’ burgeoning ability to
monitor and control its workers.

Disconnect,
NOTRE
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&
COMP.
L.
(forthcoming
2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3116158.
337 Ajunwa et al., supra note 12, at 774.
338 See infra note 341.
339 Ajunwa et al., supra note 12, at 775.
340 Crawford & Schultz, Big Data, supra note 12, at 126-127. In 2014, the White House detailed
various privacy initiatives, including ensuring access to health, tax, home energy usage, and student
loan information; it also described its Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, which advocated for
individual control, transparency, respect for context, security, access and accuracy, focused
collection, and accountability. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES 13-14, 19-20 (2014).
341 Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing
American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 347–48 (2014) (describing at-will employment
which, with some exceptions, allows any party to end the employment relationship for any reason);
Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV L.
REV. 1880, 1880-1881 (2013).
342
Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 341, at 352.
343 See supra notes 267, 282-285.
344 David Shepardson, Tech Companies Back U.S. Privacy Law if it Preempts California’s,
REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2018.
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D. Regulating Automated Personnel Systems: What Happens
When Your Computer Acts Like a Bigot?
Emerging technologies, particularly AI, will transform employers’ approach
to personnel management.345 Indeed, AI is already making significant inroads at
the biggest companies, particularly as the driver of “predictive analytics,” which
employers use to improve their personnel decisions. One survey found that around
half of the organizations use AI for recruiting higher-skilled workers, with over a
third of those using the technology for tasks such as selecting, interviewing, and
onboarding candidates.346 Other companies rely extensively on algorithmic
“bosses” to handle most communications with workers. 347 Some employers have
become adept at using technology to manipulate workers’ “free choice” of when
to work, 348 such as the psychological nudges that Uber uses to encourage drivers
to accept fares at opportune times.349 Still others employ AI for scheduling and
other operational decisions that impact working conditions. 350 These uses of AI
raise many legal questions.
Take the recent controversy surrounding employers’ increased use of on-time
scheduling. Businesses understandably like being able to schedule workers more
precisely, which allows them to avoid paying wages when workers are not needed
and to increase work during peak times. Currently, data analytics already provides
a great degree of scheduling precision—so much so that it causes substantial
problems for workers. 351 This is especially true for workers with multiple jobs, as
it is hard to juggle different work schedules at the last minute. AI has the potential
to make this issue far worse, as it can greatly enhance employers’ ability to
implement on-demand scheduling, thereby making it even less predictable for
workers.352 On the other hand, AI could also help mitigate this problem if
employers are either required or volunteer to do so.353
One of the more pressing issues related to AI—and therefore the focus of this
section—is employment discrimination, for which AI promises both opportunities
and risks. If used properly, AI can help identify and root out irrational and biased

345
Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 857
(2017).
346 State of AI in Talent Acquisition, MONTAGE RESEARCH REPORT 4 (2018) (surveying talent
acquisition recruiters and decisionmakers, finding that AI is used by 34% of the organizations for
selecting
candidates,
36%
for
interviewing,
and
37%
for
onboarding),
https://engage.montagetalent.com/resources/artificial-intelligence-in-talent-acquisition.
347 Rosenblat, supra note 50.
348
Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017).
349 Schreiber, Uber, supra note 49.
350 See supra notes 351-348 and accompanying notes; Cherry, Beyond Misclassification, supra
note 250, at 596-597.
351 The problem has become so acute that states and localities have begun restricting employers’
use of on-time scheduling. Shifting Shifts, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2018.
352 Matthew Lynley, Legion Rasies $10.5M to Roll Out An Automated Employee Scheduling Tool,
TECHCRUNCH, Sept. 27, 2017.
353
Id.; Valery Yakubovich, Roman V. Galperin, & Mouna, El Mansouri, Timing Is Money: The
Flexibility and Precariousness of Login Employment (working paper, 2018) (discussing work
systems that allowed workers to commit to a certain schedule in exchange for getting more work),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247017.
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decision-making.354 AI’s promise lies in its ability to analyze employment data to
look for evidence of bias that may not be readily apparent to humans—a promise
that Google and others have been actively selling to employers in recent years.355
Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency
tasked with enforcing most federal employment discrimination laws, has begun
using AI to aid its own anti-discrimination efforts. 356 Yet, there are many hurdles
to this use of AI to mitigate discrimination, particularly access to good data and
the potential legal or practical disincentives to highlighting existing
discrimination.357 And even if employers have a genuine desire to eradicate
discrimination, there are questions whether using AI to do so would be lawful. For
example, if an employer trained an AI algorithm to identify applicants who are
members of a protected class, such as race or sex, to reduce discrimination it may
open itself up to a reverse discrimination suit by other applicants.358 And even if
an employer did not explicitly engage in such labelling, other variables may be so
closely linked with membership in a protected class that their use produces the
same result. 359 Despite these hurdles, however, many companies are already
exploring AI as a means to address diversity and discrimination issues. 360 But what
if those attempts go awry? What if, rather than reducing discrimination, the AI
algorithm causes it? In that case, questions arise regarding the apportionment of
liability. In particular, if an AI program is responsible for some or all of a hiring
decision, does the employer possess the necessary intent or culpability to establish
an employment discrimination claim?
To address this liability question, one must first understand how AI could
allow or cause discrimination. Data is the key.361 AI is only as good as the data it
uses to learn, so if an employer has a workforce that is not diverse—whether
because of past discrimination or simply because certain types of people rarely
seek out that type of work—then a program using that data will likely reflect that
lack of diversity.362 In other words, the program will exclude these
underrepresented applicants, even if they would have been valuable workers.
Another issue is that AI generally looks for patterns, but doesn’t question whether

354 Carin interview, supra note 37 (arguing that AI can do a good job inferring biases against
certain categories of individual); Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 872-873
(describing attempts to use data analytics to reduce employment discrimination).
355 Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 1011-1012; Farhad Manjoo, The Happiness Machine: How
Google Became Such a Great Place to Work, SLATE, Jan. 21, 2013 (describing Google’s use of AI
to improve working conditions).
356 Paige Smith, Machine Learning Deployed to Help EEOC Predict Discrimination, BLOOMBERG
LAW, Dec. 27, 2018.
357 Evidence that an employer was aware that a step in its selection process was biased could be
used to show intent to discriminate; employers may also be reticent to use or correct AI if it forces
them to undertake expensive changes. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 897,
924-925.
358 Id. at 867.
359 Barocas & Selbst, supra note at 362, at 691-692.
360 Montage, supra note 346, at 6 (finding that 38% of surveyed large organizations are trying to
us AI to eliminate bias and 35% to meet diversity goals).
361 Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 1015-1017.
362 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671,
680, 684 (2016); Oliva interview, supra note 16 (analogizing to an AI analysis of a data set that
doesn’t include someone with umbrella; if so, the program will never choose anyone with umbrella);
cf. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. __ (forthcoming 2019) (discussion racial
bias in predicting crime).
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those patterns are based on causation—and thus identify factors that are really
drivers of better work performance—or random correlation. 363 Finally, merely
defining what it means to be a good worker, which is ostensibly the goal, is not
easy and involves subjective judgments that can introduce bias into the process. 364
Amazon’s recent experience with AI highlights many of these problems. The
company, known for its data-driven personnel policies,365 recently abandoned a
multi-year project to develop AI for hiring decisions because the resulting
algorithm was explicitly biased against female applicants.366 The reason for this
bias was that the program trained with a dataset made up of past Amazon
applicants, who were predominately men. As a result, the algorithm essentially
learned to correlate “male” with “good employee”; it simply didn’t see enough
females to suggest otherwise. Accordingly, the algorithm explicitly rejected any
applicant it could identify as female, such as individuals who graduated from
women’s colleges or were members of female-oriented organizations.367 A similar
problem can also occur if AI overgeneralizes information. For instance, different
populations or cultures use distinct facial cues and other signifying expressions. 368
Thus, an AI algorithm that analyzes facial cues from a dataset dominated by one
population may misinterpret cues from individuals in other populations.369 Finally,
AI’s learning process may not work well with employment. In contrast to analyses
of medical scans or financial transactions, there are few opportunities for
employers to correct an algorithm’s learning process by identifying proper and
improper decisions.370
As Amazon’s failed experiment demonstrates, an AI program’s training is
critical to its success or failure. In an ideal world, employers would randomly hire
a qualified sample of individuals from the relevant labor market and use AI to
analyze the types of workers who produced the best results. This, of course, is
completely unrealistic, so responsible employers must seek acceptable second-best
solutions. This means, among other things, that employers using AI will need to
collect the best data available, avoiding homogenous or biased samples. And to
prevent a similar “garbage-in-garbage-out” problem in defining a “good
worker,”371 employers should first use AI to analyze their current personnel
practices to identify areas of bias and correct those issues before having an
algorithm learn how to make personnel decisions.372 And, once such a program is
in place, its goals should include more than just individual performance. Instead,

363

Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 875, 880-881.
Barocas & Selbst, supra note at 362, at 679-680, 688.
365 Jodi Kantor & David Streitfeld, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a Bruising Workplace,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2015.
366 Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Shows Bias Against Women,
REUTERS, Oct. 9, 2018.
367 Id.
368 Marianna Pogosyan, Emotion Perceptions Across Cultures, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 9, 2016.
369 Lynch interview, supra note 46; cf. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades:
Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROCEEDINGS, 1ST
CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 77 (2018) (finding that three
commercially available facial recognition programs incorrectly classified light-skinned men no more
than 0.8% of the time, but dark-skinned women 20%-34.7% of the time).
370 Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 882 (noting that an employer will not
know if a rejected applicant would have been a good employee and employers’ biases, whether
intentional or not, can inhibit the correction process).
371 See supra note 364.
372 Carin interview, supra note 37.
364
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employers should take advantage of AI’s ability to analyze the performance of
teams and perhaps identify different types of workers who, in combination with
others, are more successful than they appear to be in isolation.373
That a company as large and well-versed in technology as Amazon was
incapable of developing an unbiased hiring program speaks volumes about the
difficulty in using AI for personnel decisions. It should also serve as a strong
warning to other companies about the limits of AI. There are right ways and wrong
ways to use AI technology and Amazon’s experience demonstrates that the right
way can be extremely difficult. To its credit, Amazon never implemented the
program. But others may not be so careful or responsible. Some companies may
be familiar with AI and other technology but are insensitive to discrimination
issues.374 Other companies may be less tech-savvy and become so blinded by the
novelty of AI that they fail to realize that, like all tools, it is appropriate for some
uses but not others.
The potential for AI to cause discriminatory personnel decisions begs the
question whether there are effective legal means to challenge these decisionmaking processes? The short answer, for now at least, is “not really.” Like other
emerging technologies, AI is so fundamentally different from traditional
employment practices, that our anti-discrimination laws are poorly equipped to
handle the challenges it poses.375
In exploring this question, I will focus on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 376
which is the primary federal employment discrimination statute. Although other
statutes differ from Title VII in important ways, for present purposes Title VII
adequately represents the field. A traditional Title VII discrimination claim is
referred to as “disparate treatment,” which involves an adverse employment action
that is motivated by the victim’s race, sex, religion, or other protected class. 377 The
need to find motivation or intent triggers a critical problem in challenging a
discriminatory AI program. Unless victims can prove that the employer was aware
of the discrimination, they will be unable to win an intent-based disparate treatment
claim. 378 The employer can simply, and successfully, argue that it didn’t know
what the program was doing.
There is an alternative to a disparate treatment claim. Under the “disparate
impact” theory of discrimination, an employer can violate Title VII for using a
facially neutral employment practice that results in discrimination and is not shown
to be job-related and a business necessity. 379 Historically, the disparate impact
theory primarily addressed employers’ use of testing to predict future employee
performance, balancing the desire to eradicate workplace discrimination against
properly validated tests that satisfy genuine business needs.380 Although disparate

Id.; Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 972-973 (describing Google’s “Project Aristotle,” a data
analysis of work teams).
374 Ifeoama Ajunwa, Age Discrimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. __
(forthcoming 2019).
375 Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 865.
376 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17.
377 Id. § 2000e-(a)(1).
378 Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI (2018), manuscript at 3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125738.
379 Plaintiffs can theoretically still win a disparate impact claim after an employer shows jobrelatedness and business necessity by showing that alternative practice existed that leads to lessdiscriminatory results, but in practice, plaintiffs almost never win on this point. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(2); LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 24.03 (2d ed. 1998).
380 Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 1023-1024.
373
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impact now applies to a variety of policies, employment tests provide an obvious
parallel to AI as both selection devices can produce discriminatory results even if
implemented in good-faith. Consequently, disparate impact appear to be a good fit
for discriminatory AI. However, even when challenging traditional practices,
disparate impact claims are notoriously difficult to win.381 Those difficulties
become even more acute with AI.
One major problem with using the disparate impact theory to challenge AI is
the job-related and business necessity defense. By definition, when an AI program
identifies a positive characteristic, it has found a link to better job performance.
This leads to a likely dispositive question: is AI’s finding of correlation enough to
show job-relatedness and business necessity?382 For instance, Amazon’s hiring
program found that being male was correlated with effective performance; if the
program was implemented and later challenged, the company could argue that
program identified job-related characteristics that were necessary to the business.
But litigating that issue can be tricky. Under the current judicial understanding of
Title VII, plaintiffs and the court would need access to the program and the data it
trained on to present a disparate impact challenge;383 however, this information
may be deemed private and raise intellectual property issues, especially if an
employer is using third-party technology. Moreover, even if they have access to
this information, the parties and judges (as well as, shudder the thought, juries)
will need to develop expertise with this new technology.
If these hurdles can be overcome, then courts will need to address whether AI
correlations can ever satisfy the job-related and business necessity defense and, if
so, under what conditions. On this score, we do have some useful guidance. The
EEOC has long promulgated guidelines for validating employment tests and other
selection procedures under the disparate impact theory.384 The agency should
update these guidelines to account for special issues associated with AI. 385 Indeed,
because of the difficulty in developing adequate data sets, as well as possible
coding bugs and statistical uncertainties, it is crucial that AI decision-making
schemes use valid and robust techniques to ensure they are not producing
undesirable outcomes.386 What might AI validation guidelines entail? Among the
practices that should be considered are transparency and notice, program design,
procedural requirements, audits, and employee input.387

381 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. R EV. 701, 740-43
(2006). The disparate impact analysis under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is even more
challenging for plaintiffs. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (establishing employer
defense if challenged practice was “based on reasonable factors other than age”).
382 Sullivan, supra note 378, at 16, 22; Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 86667, 907-908, 920-921; see also James Grimmelmann & David Westreich, Incomprehensible
Discrimination, 7 CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 170 (2017) (arguing that an algorithm’s finding of
correlation should not be sufficient to satisfy defense).
383 Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 915-916.
384 EEOC, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.
385 Sullivan, supra note 378, at 23-27 (discussing current guidelines and shortcomings as applied
to AI); Alan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, Big Data and the Risk of Employment Discrimination,
68 OKLA L. REV. 555, 574 (2016) (arguing that current guidelines could be used for AI). However,
courts would need to defer to the EEOC’s updated guidelines more than currently, or Congress would
need to codify them, to have any lasting impact. Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 1033-1037.
386
Oliva interview, supra note 16 (describing use of auto-pilot technology on airplanes, which is
frequently validated to ensure that AI systems are producing desirable and safe results).
387 Micah Altman et al., A Harm-Reduction Framework for Algorithmic Fairness, 16 IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY 34, 36 (2018) (advocating that use of algorithms for policing and other areas
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The lack of transparency in most AI analyses is a serious cause for concern.
Because AI learns through complicated, iterative analyses of data, the bases for a
program’s decision-making is often unclear. This lack of transparency, often
referred to as the “black box” problem, could act as a mask for discrimination or
other results that society deems unacceptable.388 Imagine if Amazon had not been
evaluating its AI program and ended up using an anti-female hiring process
without knowing that it was causing discrimination or why. This problem is
aggravated when an employer fails to notify employees that it is using AI.
Increased transparency, although not a cure-all,389 would also help mitigate the
“black box” perception problem and provide more details about why the algorithm
is making its choices. 390
Computer science techniques—such as designing algorithms to avoid
discrimination, make some random selections, and employ fairness constraints—
can also help prevent discriminatory results.391 Moreover, procedural protections
would better ensure fair and accurate analyses, such as requiring employers to
notify workers of the use of AI and providing workers the opportunity correct any
erroneous data.392 Similarly, including workers in the process, such as helping to
develop the target metrics used by the AI program, could garner more buy-in and
possibly avoid missteps. 393 Finally, ensuring that programs are audited for
discriminatory effects could provide a useful backstop. 394
Although not perfect, AI validation guidelines would go a long way in helping
to adjust the current Title VII disparate impact regime to the challenges posed by
AI. But a more robust response would be to create either a special AI disparate
impact rule or an entirely new disparate impact analysis that better fits AI. The
primary aim for such a reform would be to provide employers with incentives to
use AI in an appropriate manner. The strongest incentive would occur under a strict
liability regime, although any significant increase in the risk of liability would be
beneficial. A new liability standard doesn’t even require new legislation, as the
text of Title VII could support strict liability. 395 This, however, would require the

should identify major design choices, assess algorithm’s effects, measure well-being and ethical
choices, and recognize potential discriminatory effects of design).
388 Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 881, 888-889.
389 Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018) (explaining limitations of requiring explanations of machine
learning).
390 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 340, at 17; Crawford & Schultz, Big Data, supra
note 12, at 126; Miriam A. Cherry, The Gamification of Work, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851, 857 (2012).
But see Joshua A. Kroll et all., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. P A. L. REV. 633, 657 (2017).
391 Kroll et al., supra note 390, at 778-784.
392 Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 917-925; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, Essay, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH L. R EV. 1,
20-22 (2014). The UK’s Data Protection Act provides similar protections for employment tests.
393 See supra note 364; Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 1033-1037.
394 Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189
(2017); cf. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policy, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017)
(advocating “algorithmic impact statements,” similar to environmental impact statements, for
predictive policing technology).
395 Very briefly, this theory argues that an employer’s good-faith use of discriminatory AI violates
two related provisions of Title VII that prohibit 1) adverse employment actions made “because of”
an individual’s protected class, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1); and 2) actions that “limit, segregate, or
classify” individuals in a way that hurts their employment conditions “because of” their protected
class, id. § 2000e-(a)(2). In other words, even if the employer did not intend for the program to
discriminate, its reliance on such a program would violate these provisions by failing to hire
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Supreme Court to undergo a dramatic shift from its current, judicially created,
proof-shifting analysis. 396
In sum, AI offers both promise and risk, and our workplace laws need to be
prepared for the consequences. Indeed, employers are already using AI, and it is
only a matter of time before we see legal challenges to the results. Companies like
Amazon are not the main concern, as they have the resources and reputational
incentives to sweat the details needed to use AI in an ethical and nondiscriminatory fashion. The more serious danger involves smaller or more
insulated employers that are attracted to a new technology like AI—potentially for
its ability to provide a layer of insulation in the decision-making process—and
have little incentive to expend the time and money to avoid discriminatory
outcomes. Some of those companies could even use AI as a mask for intentional
discrimination. 397 The risks of such transgressions necessitate an antidiscrimination regime that recognizes the shortcomings of AI and provides
companies sufficient incentive to use the technology in a responsible fashion.
E. Regulating Workplace Safety: Stopping the Killer Robots
The intense media scrutiny of recent fatalities involving Teslas and other
autonomous vehicles illustrates the fear associated with new technology. 398 Many
of these technologies promise increased safety overall, 399 but that potential comes
with risks. There are inherent difficulties associated with any substantial changes
in the way people do things, particularly when they involve speeding vehicles, fast
moving robots, and the like. Thus, recognizing and addressing the potential
dangers of technology is essential to its widespread adoption and to ensure that
workers who interact with these technologies remain safe.
The increasingly blended workplace, where human works interact with robots,
AI, and other technology, raises numerous liability related questions should
accidents or other harms occur. For instance, if an autonomous vehicle causes a
collision that injures a worker, who is responsible? The employer that required the
worker to use the vehicle? The vehicle manufacturer? The company that built the
monitoring hardware? The vehicle’s software developer? Given the numerous and
complex systems required to operate an autonomous vehicle, it may be difficult to
apportion blame. In addition, it is unclear how much, if any, responsibility the
employer should shoulder. Similar issues can arise with traditional vehicles,400 but
complexities of autonomous technology amplifies things. Large car companies are
sensitive to these concerns because of the potential for legal liability and damage
to their brand, but smaller companies may be less so. Indeed, one start-up—
essentially a single individual—has already developed an inexpensive way to turn

applicants and classifying them “because of” their sex. Sullivan, supra note 378, at 12, 16-17 (citing
Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006)).
396 See supra note 379.
397 Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 345, at 884; Bodie et al., supra note 48, at 1014.
398
See supra notes 142-146.
399 See, e.g., supra note 147.
400 Robert L. Rabin, Accommodating Tort Law: Alternative Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1119, 1129 (2017).
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non-autonomous cars into self-driving ones.401 Companies like this are likely to
lack the resources or incentives to adequately account for safety. As a result, absent
appropriate regulation, workers will be at risk of serious injury or death.
Generally, the common-law tort system’s basic framework for allocating
blame can cope with the harms resulting from robots, autonomous vehicles, and
other emerging technologies. But when tech-related injuries happen to employees,
tort law is largely inapplicable.402 Instead, as is no surprise at this point, we have a
fragmented system of federal and state regulations to address these harms.
An overly simplified summary of workplace safety law is that it rests on two
pillars: the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act403 (OSHA) and its state
counterparts, as well as individual state workers’ compensation laws. Workers’
compensation is essentially a scheme that funnels most workplace accidents into a
mandated compensation plan. 404 Because it focuses on the results of an accident
rather than the cause, new technology is unlikely to have a significant impact on
workers compensation systems other than changing the number and causes of
injuries. For instance, we would expect to see technology reduce the number of
claims by making the workplace safer, 405 yet some technology may cause injuries,
such as human-robot accidents. Accordingly, as long as states do not treat techrelated injuries differently than traditional ones, we are unlikely to see much
impact on workers’ compensation systems. However, the issue is worth monitoring
in case certain technologies end up materially changing the number or severity of
workplace injuries. One scheme through which this monitoring could occur is
OSHA and related workplace safety laws.
A thorough overview of OSHA is (well) beyond the scope of this Article,406
but it is worth briefly describing the statute’s capacity to address technology’s
impact on worker safety. OSHA, like workers’ compensation and other workplace
laws, protects only statutory employees, so workers classified as independent
contractors are largely left on their own to seek redress—mainly via the tort
system—for any injuries or health issues arising from work.407 For covered
employees, OSHA provides two main forms of protection. First is its general duty
clause, which requires employers to provide a workplace “free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious harm.” 408 The “likely
to cause” language reflects OSHA’s advantage over the workers compensation

401 Andrew J. Hawkins, George Hotz is on a Hacker Crusade Against the “Scam” of Self-driving
Cars, THE VERGE, Jul. 13, 2018 (also describing his opensource software that overrides cars’ driver
assist systems).
402 See infra note 407. Some of the same issues can arise when a third-party is injured by a worker
using a certain technology, in which case the primary issue will be whether the employer is
vicariously liable for any resulting liability. Rabin, supra note 400, at 1129.
403 29 U.S.C. §§ 652 et seq.
404 MICHAEL C. D UFF, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION L AW (2013).
405 See supra notes 94, 92, 171, 283.
406 See generally J EFFREY M. HIRSCH, PAUL M. SECUNDA, & R ICHARD A. BALES, UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAW 232-252 (2nd ed. 2013) (describing federal and state regulation of workplace
safety and health).
407 OSHA uses the typical common-law test for employment. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6); supra note 245.
It also excludes most public-sector employees, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5), although federal agencies must
establish rules that are consistent with OSHA and states typically develop regulatory systems that,
while varying in many ways, track OSHA. HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 406, at 252-253.
408 29 U.S.C. § 652 (a)(1).
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system by imposing a duty on employers to prevent harm before it occurs. 409 Some
risks emanating from emerging technologies will obviously fall under this clause,
such as the well-known, serious potential for accidents involving autonomous
vehicles.410 But other looming dangers are unlikely to trigger the general duty
clause, especially in the near term. This is because the clause requires a hazard to
be recognized as causing or likely to cause death or serious harm. 411 Thus,
unknown and underappreciated risks will not impose any duties on employers, nor
will known risks that fall short of “serious harm.”412 A further limitation is that
even known hazards that cause serious harm trigger the general duty clause only
when there exists a feasible method to correct the hazard.413 As a result, the general
duty clause will fail to provide much, if any, protection for some risks associated
with many new technologies.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (which I’ll refer to as the
“agency” to avoid confusion with the statute) also has the ability to promulgate
regulations addressing specific workplace hazards.414 However, among the many
problems with OSHA’s notoriously cumbersome and inadequate enforcement
scheme 415 is that its rulemaking process is quite time-consuming and requires a
substantial amount of evidence to survive judicial review. 416 As a result, the agency
is often very slow to address workplace safety issues, particularly new hazards;
indeed, the vast majority of “interim” standards established when the statute went
into effect in 1971 have not been replaced.417 It is no surprise, therefore, that there
are no permanent standards for even relatively well-established technology like
robotics.418 That said, the agency does provide guidance for employers to improve
robotics safety, but such guidance lacks teeth because the agency cannot mandate
or enforce their recommendations. 419

409 The threat of workers’ compensation liability can incentivize employers to provide a safer
workplace, similar to the potential of OSHA fines; however, workers’ compensation laws impose no
affirmative duty to address workplace safety. Id. § 666(b); OSHA, OSHA Penalties,
https://www.osha.gov/penalties/.
410 Although some may argue that autonomous vehicles or other technology are not “likely to
cause” harm. See supra note 147.
411 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 406, at 234-243 (discussing types of standards and their
requirements).
415 Id. at 247-252 (describing OSHA’s difficulties in obtaining judicial approval of its standards).
416
29 U.S.C. § 655(f); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petro. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 653
(1980).
417 HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 406, at 327.
418
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https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/robotics/hazardevaluation.html; id., ROBOTICS : HAZARD RECOGNITION,
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/robotics/hazardrecognition.html; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMIN., OSHA TECHNICAL MANUAL § 4, CH. 4, INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS AND ROBOT SYSTEM SAFETY,
https://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/otm_iv/otm_iv_4.html.
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Other agencies may also play a role for certain types of technology, like the
Department of Transportation’s guidance for autonomous vehicles. 420 But it is
clear that this patchwork of regulatory authority is severely lacking. What is really
needed is a comprehensive set of rules addressing technology currently in the
workplace, ideally within a framework that could also consider technology on the
horizon. For instance, we lacks rules protecting employees from the possible illeffects of VR use at work or the psychological and physiological stress that can
occur when AI systems control the pace and conditions of work. 421 On the other
hand, policymakers should do much more to incentive employers to use
technology that can improve workers’ health, such as the use of robots in
dangerous environments or using AI systems to identify and mitigate hazards. But
a complete set of regulations is difficult given the fragmentation of workplace
law.422 The proposal to broadly centralize workplace regulation that I discuss later
would address many of these issues,423 but short of that, we should seek more
coordination among relevant agencies and actors to better anticipate and mitigate
tech-related hazards and encourage the use of technology to improve workers’
safety.
F. A Workplace Without Boundaries: How to
Regulate Ready Player One Jobs
Perhaps the most important impact on work in the last half-century, both in the
U.S. and abroad, has been the rise of globalism. Among other effects, the striking
expansion of global labor markets led to a dramatic increase in companies’ ability
to use foreign workers and other types of “offshoring.”424 Although globalism
brought benefits, it also imposed significant costs on many individuals via job
losses, decreased wages, and weakening of workplace standards.425 These are the
consequences of globalism’s erosion of traditional, intra-national labor markets,
which made it easier and more cost-effective for certain companies to use workers

420 In 2018, the Department of Transportation published draft updates to its autonomous vehicles
guidance. U.S DEP’T TRANSPORTATION, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION:
AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3.0 (2018), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/automatedvehicles.
421
See EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, FORESIGHT ON NEW AND
EMERGING OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH D IGITALISATION BY 2025
(2018),
https://osha.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Foresight_new_OSH_risks_2025_
report.pdf (discussing need for regulation).
422 See supra note 174; infra note 473
423 See infra Part III.
424
Solid conclusions on job impacts are hard to come by, but one estimate is that the world labor
supply nearly doubled in the 1990s due to the rise of globalism. RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA
WORKS : CRITICAL THOUGHT ON THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S. LABOR MARKET 128-40 (2007) (noting rise
from 3.3 billion to 6 billion workers); see also George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency
Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 957 (2007) (estimating 4.1 million service jobs moved
from developed to developing economies). An employee-advocacy group has recently analyzed
Department of Labor data and concluded that offshoring has resulted in an average yearly loss of
89,906 U.S. jobs since January 2017. George Faraday, Good Jobs Nation, Promises Broken #2: The
Offshoring
of
American
Jobs
Continue
(2018),
http://goodjobsnation.org/content/uploads/2018/08/Broken-Promises2.pdf.
425 George S. Roukis, Global Labor’s Uncertain Future, 30 J. COLL. NEGOTIATIONS 271 (2005);
Brian Burgoon & Wade Jacoby, Patchwork Solidarity: Describing and Explaining US and European
Labour Internationalism, 11 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 849, 855-63 (2004).
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living abroad. 426 For those who are concerned about maintaining jobs and
workplace standards, both internationally and in their home countries, this trend
has been extremely problematic. Not for lack of trying, it has become apparent that
there are few, if any, viable options for preventing businesses from seeking work
in countries with lower labor costs and weaker work protections—leaving
offshoring as a persistent feature of the modern economy.427 As a result, certain
segments of the workforce in countries like the U.S. have faced severe job losses,
or significant erosions in their earning power and ability to advocate for better
working conditions.
A major driver of the rise in globalism was technology, particularly advances
in communications and transportation. 428 This fact naturally leads one to question
whether emerging technologies are likely to contribute to this trend. Technology’s
ability to change or displace jobs will certainly make this problem worse for many
workers by further weakening the demand for labor in certain markets.429 But I
turn here to another technology that is more directly connected to globalism:
virtual reality (VR).
As any science-fiction fan could tell you, current VR technology is still quite
rudimentary compared to its potential. 430 But as VR continues to develop, we will
be able to simulate most face-to-face interactions from virtually anywhere. This
ability, in turn, will transform many jobs. Today, most work requiring meaningful
interactions must be performed in the same geographic location.431 VR will change
that. Imagine, for instance, a secondary school. Currently, the vast majority of
schools have teachers and students interacting in person. 432 However, if VR
technology can accurately mimic the in-person experience, a teacher could
effectively teach students who are dispersed around the world. 433 Other
technologies can contribute to this trend. For instance, AI-based natural language
programs should eventually be able to provide truly synchronous language
translation,434 thereby eliminating the linguistic barriers that hinder current
attempts at remote work. Moreover, advances in robotics will vastly improve VR
haptics, thereby allowing individuals to virtually manipulate objects around the
world.435 Thus, in the future, many types of work will have few, if any, geographic

426

Geis, supra note 424, at 963-966.
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Making Globalism Work for Employees, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 427, 439
(2010).
428 Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representation in a World of Global
Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 87 (2009); Katherine V.W. Stone,
A New Labor Law for a New World of Work: The Case for a Comparative-Transnational Approach,
28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J 565, 571 (2007); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Workforce
Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century: Changing Labor Force Dynamics and the Role
of Gov’t Policies 6 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04845sp.pdf.
429 See infra Section II.A.
430 See, e.g., ERNEST C LINE, R ADIO P LAYER ONE (2011).
431 Videoconferencing and other similar technologies are used heavily, but they are not as effective
as face-to-face interactions in most cases. Jeff Koyen, The Case for Face-to-Face, FORBES INSIGHTS
(2009).
432 Some distance learning school are in use, but they are generally perceived as inferior to inperson classrooms. Susan M. Dynarski, Online Schooling: Who is Harmed and Who is Helped?,
BROOKINGS, Oct. 26, 2017 (describing studies).
433
CLINE, supra note 430.
434 Bernard Marr, Will Machine Learning AI Make Human Translators an Endangered Species?,
FORBES, Aug. 24, 2018.
435 See supra 70-71.
427
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boundaries and no physical workplace other than workers’ individual VR rigs. But
this leads to a question of what, if any, laws apply to such work?436
In general, the answer is that workers are governed by the laws of the country
in which they physically work.437 For those who seek enhanced workplace
security, the goal is a more level playing field where standards do not hue too
closely to the laws of a particular country. The two primary avenues for doing so
are to establish multinational workplace standards or to extend one country’s laws
to workers in another country. 438 Neither option has proved successful thus far, but
technology’s amplification of this problem is likely to increase the push for both.
The inclusion of labor standards in multinational agreements is not new, nor
has it been particularly successful. 439 The most robust example involves the
European Union, whose labor standards cover most workers in the member
countries.440 However, interpretations of those standards have been notable for
their willingness to exempt foreign workers. On the other hand, for many European
workers, the standards have been beneficial. As a result, workers in European
countries with relatively weak protections have seen improvements in their
working conditions, while workers in other countries face a lower risk of
offshoring.441 But it is not realistic to expect an expansion of the transnational labor
standards in the current political climate. Even in Europe, the very notion of the
EU has been weakened by Brexit and other forces. And multinational agreements
have fallen out of favor with the current U.S. administration. That said, the U.S.
has been open to improving labor protections in bilateral and trilateral agreements,
most notably in a recent proposed update to NAFTA. 442 Attempts to protect
workers via trade agreements have not been especially fruitful in the past,443 but

436

It can also create problems related to compensation. For instance, an employer could violate
wage payment laws if it pays workers in non-traditional currency, such as Bitcoin. This could be a
factor in employers seeking labor in countries without wage payment requirements.
437 There are some exceptions, such as Title VII’s application to a U.S. employee working abroad
for a U.S. company. See infra notes 447-448
438 Other, more limited options, include organizing coordinated collective action among foreign
workers, pressuring employers to adopt labor standard agreements, and promoting new forms of
organizations that can assist workers and provide them benefits. Hirsch, Globalism, supra note 427,
at 439-464.
439 Id. at 457-461.
440
Estreicher, Think Global, supra note 428, at 89. The International Labour Organization also
promotes international labor standards and has 187 member states. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 37 I.L.M 1233
(1998). ILO standards are fairly broad, however, and for most countries, do little to create direct
improvements for workers. Among other problems, the ILO has no enforcement authority and many
countries, including the U.S., have not ratified most ILO standards. Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel
J.B. Mitchell, The American Experience with Labor Standards and Trade Agreements, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 41, 47-49 (1999).
441 Sara Kahn-Nisser, Channels of Influence: The EU and Delta Convergence of Core Labour
Standards in the Eastern Neighborhood, 29 EUR. J DEV. RES. 127 (2017).
442 Jim Tankersley, Trump Loves the New NAFTA. Congress Doesn’t., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2019;
see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 340, at 20 (stressing that integrating countries’
different privacy frameworks is important to ensuring “robust international commerce”).
443 None of the complaints brought under the NAFTA labor side agreement, N ORTH AMERICAN
AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION C AN.-MEX.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (Sept. 14, 1993), have
resulted in any concrete remedies. Diana Chew & Richard A. Posthuma, International Employment
Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA’s Side Agreement on Labor, 53 LAB. L.J., 38 (2002) (reviewing
all NAALC cases filed at time of publication); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, North American
Free Trade Agreement: U.S. Experience with Environment, Labor, and Investor Dispute Settlement
Cases 31 (2001).
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these agreements are better than nothing444 and could lead the way to more
meaningful steps in the future.
An alternative option is for the U.S. to extend the reach of its workplace
protections beyond its borders. 445 However, that path is not easy. The Supreme
Court has long taken a restrictive view of statutes’ extraterritorial reach. For
instance, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), the Court held that
Title VII did not apply to U.S. citizens working abroad for U.S. employers because
it lacked a clear statement of congressional intent for extraterritorial application.446
Later that same year, Congress amended Title VII to make clear that it should apply
to U.S. citizens working abroad for U.S. companies,447 and it has done the same
for other workplace legislation.448 Although beneficial in some cases, these
extraterritorial clauses do nothing to address the broader concern of U.S.
companies relying more heavily on workers in other countries. Congress has not
attempted to extend traditional workplace laws to foreign workers,449 and there is
some question whether it is allowed to do so. However, there is precedent for
limited extensions of U.S. law to foreign employees working for U.S. employers
in other countries.450 In particular, when a law is not primarily focused on domestic
matters, such as maritime legislation, then the presumption against
extraterritoriality is much weaker, if it exists at all.451 This suggests that although
extending most current workplace laws to foreign workers may not be possible,
new legislation targeted specifically to work done virtually may have a better
chance of passing muster with the courts.
Although VR is unlikely to hasten globalism’s effect on the labor market
anytime soon, it will likely do so in the future. Given the current political
environment, it is hard to envision a meaningful effort either to join a multinational
labor standards agreement or to extend U.S. workplace protections to certain
foreign workers. Yet, as VR and related technology expand companies’ capacity
to offshore work and further erode domestic work standards, the pressure to assist
U.S. workers may increase. We can never eliminate labor cost considerations, but

444

Even modest labor standards can provide some significant benefits to workers, but only with
effective enforcement mechanisms. Estreicher, Think Global, supra note 428, at 90-91.
445 See generally Lance Compa, Pursuing International Labour Rights in U.S. Courts: New Uses
for Old Tools, 57 INDUS. RELATIONS 48 (2002) (discussing options for U.S. litigation of foreignrelated workplace claims).
446 499 U.S. 244 (1991). The Court’s recent decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European
Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), established a two-step framework for determining a statute’s
extraterritoriality. The first step asks “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it
applies extraterritorially.” Id. at 2101. The second step states that “[i]f the conduct relevant to the
statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic
application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct . . . occurred in a foreign country,
then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct
that occurred in U.S. territory.” Id.; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013)
(holding that presumption against extraterritorial application applied to Alien Tort Statute claim
against multinational company for human rights abuses against foreign workers).
447 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
448 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4) (ADA). Other statutes
lack extraterritorial clauses. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (FLSA).
449 For instance, Title VII’s extraterritorial provision does not cover non-U.S. citizens working
abroad for American companies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
450 Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67, 73 (2nd Cir. 1995) (applying Longshore
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act).
451 Id. at 71.
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we do have options to reduce employers’ ability and incentives to move work
abroad. Failure to do so could well result in further job losses and poorer work
conditions for U.S. workers.
G. Using Technology to Enable Disabled Workers
Perhaps no group of workers are most likely to gain from emerging technology
than those who are disabled. Today, disabled workers are already benefitting
greatly from technology that help reduce barriers to work and that assistance will
almost certainly grow dramatically over time. Accordingly, our policy and legal
goals should promote technological applications that aid disabled workers and
mitigate some of the problems that these applications may create.
Countless innovations in development or already in use can drastically change
the ways people interact, move, and work. Many of these advances will,
intentionally or not, allow disabled workers to perform tasks that were previously
beyond their abilities. The health care field is a particularly apt illustration.
“Wearable” technology, while raising questions about privacy, shows real promise
in enabling individuals to better manage chronic conditions such as diabetes and
heart disease.452 Moreover, advances in robotics and AI are leading to “smart”
prosthetics and other devices that will greatly expand disabled individuals’ ability
to perform various tasks.453 Technology also holds promise as a therapeutic tool.
One example is the use of VR to provide physical therapy, even in geographic
areas where access to therapists is limited. 454 Other VR researchers have had some
success in allowing users to control aspects of the digital environment with their
thoughts.455 Also in development are exoskeletons that could help disabled
workers perform a far greater number of manual tasks. 456 These innovations are
just a small sample of the developments that will increase the number of disabled
individuals who are able to obtain work and expand their capabilities while on the
job.
Despite the promise of technology, it does pose some risks for disabled
workers and complications for both employers and employees. One issue is the
discrimination problem discussed previously; if employers use AI or other
technology to make personnel decisions, there is the potential of discrimination
against disabled workers, possibly in violation of the ADA.457 Additionally, as
employers collect increasing amounts of personal data—whether through
wearables, AI, or other information-capturing technologies—that information can
be used to identify potential disabilities. 458 The employer then risks violating the

452 Cf. CDC Foundation, Worker Illness and Injury Costs U.S. Employers $225.8 Billion Annually,
Jan. 28, 2015.
453 Andrea Powell, AI is Fueling Smarter Prosthetics than Ever Before, WIRED, Dec. 22, 2017.
454 A VR system can provide cues to help the patient track mimic certain motions or postures,
while getting feedback from the therapist. Chen Interview, supra note 64.
455 See supra notes 99-100.
456
Ajunwa, supra note 276, at 21, 28.
457 See supra Section II.C; Kevin J. Haskins, Wearable Technology and Implications for the ADA,
GINA, and Health Privacy, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 69, 70 (2017).
458 See supra note 169.
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ADA if it uses this information to negatively affect a disabled employee or it fails
to accommodate what is now a known disability. 459
As technology becomes increasingly integrated into workplaces, questions of
access will also arise. Access can cut two ways. One issue concerns employers’
voluntary adoption of technology and the need to consider its impact on disabled
employees. In particular, employees’ disabilities may prevent them from using
mandated technology,460 or the technology may create or aggravate medical
conditions.461 Failure to properly address these possibilities could lead to an ADA
violation if disabled employees are put at a disadvantage relative to their nondisabled coworkers.
In contrast to the potential harm associated with integrating technology into
the workplace, employers may also run afoul of the ADA by not providing access
to technology. Disabled employees will likely request use of various technologies
to assist them in their jobs, thereby triggering the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation mandate. Technology will not only expand the universe of
possible accommodations, but also serve as an important factor into whether an
accommodation is required at all.462
The ADA requires employers to provide disabled employees a “reasonable
accommodation,” unless it would be an “undue hardship” on the employer.463
Under the reasonable accommodation analysis, an employee must first show that
an accommodation appears reasonable on its face for a typical company.464 An
employer can respond by showing business-related circumstances that convert the
otherwise reasonable accommodation into an undue hardship for the specific
employer.465 This analysis is often quite difficult, and emerging technology will
make it more so. Courts, as well as employers and employees, will need to
familiarize themselves with the availability, efficacy, and affordability of relevant
technology as it becomes more widespread. But if history repeats, this process will
take longer than ideal.
The Seventh Circuit’s 1995 decision in Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin
Department of Administration 466 is emblematic of courts’ need to keep abreast of
technological advances. Among the accommodations requested by the disabled

459
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), 12112(b)(5). A related issue has already arisen with regard to employers’
use of wellness programs as a factor in personnel decisions. Alexander H. Tran, The Internet of
Things and Potential Remedies in Privacy Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 263, 273 (2017).
460 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(d)(4) (2017) (requiring federal agencies to ensure that disable
employees have access to technology); cf. Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d
365, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (approving ADA settlement, which required art supplier to make online
site accessible to visually impaired consumers).
461
Perez v. Interconnect Devices Inc., 1998 WL 781220, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 22, 1998) (discussing
employee’s allegation that noise from robots was exacerbating hearing loss), aff’d, 189 F.3d 478
(10th Cir. 1999); Pena v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 2018 WL 582579, at *6 (D.R.I. Jan. 29, 2018) (noting
plaintiff’s allegation that presence of robots significantly exacerbated anxiety symptoms).
462 Following the 2008 amendments to the ADA, use of assistive technology is no longer a factor
in determining whether an employee is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(e)(2).
463 An employer violates the ADA if it fails to make “reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified [employee] with a disability . . . unless [the
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
464 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002).
465 Id. at 402.
466 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
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employee in Vande Zande was to work full-time at home.467 In upholding summary
judgment in favor of the employer’s refusal to allow no more than part-time work
at home, the court, in a decision written by then-Chief Judge Posner, held that “[n]o
jury . . . could in our view be permitted to stretch the concept of ‘reasonable
accommodation’ so far.”468 According to the court, most jobs requires employees
to work in teams under supervisions; therefore, “[a]n employer is not required to
allow disabled workers to work at home, where their productivity inevitably would
be greatly reduced,” and while there are exceptions, “it would take a very
extraordinary case for the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the
employer’s failure to allow the employee to work at home.”469 Although many jobs
are still unsuitable for telecommuting, advances in communications technology
makes this decision seems laughably outdated. 470 Yet, the problem with Vande
Zande isn’t that it lacked a crystal ball, it’s that the court made a gross
generalization about technology’s effectiveness. Rather than allow a jury to
determine, based on the specific facts of the case, whether telecommuting would
be reasonable, the court entered a broad holding that erased most employees’
ability to use technology to promote the goals of the ADA. If technology is to fulfill
its potential for disabled workers, courts must be better informed about
technological developments and be more open to their application in the
workplace.471
On the whole, technology is likely to be a boon for disabled workers,
especially over the long run. However, we should expect significant hiccups along
the way as employers clumsily adopt some technologies and resist requests for
others, while courts reveal their lack of familiarity with devices more complicated
than computers and (maybe) smart phones. Efforts should be made to better
educate the courts and public about useful workplace technologies, while
providing employers incentives to adopt technologies that assist disabled
employees.472 But our fragmented workplace regulatory system is not equal to the
task of comprehensively adopting these strategies—yet another example of the
need to reform our governance of a workplace undergoing major technological
changes. Which brings us to the next topic of discussion . . . .
III. What Next? Fusing our Fragmented Workplace Laws
Emerging technologies are eliciting a considerable number of diverse
workplace concerns: widespread job losses, worker misclassification, privacy,
discrimination, safety and health, globalism, and disabled workers. The possible
solutions to these issues are even more plentiful and varied. We could—and most
likely, will—randomly adopt some of these responses as problems capture

467

Id. at 544.
Id.
469 Id. at 544-545.
470 To its credit, the court did acknowledge that telecommuting’s reasonableness “will no doubt
change as communications technology advances.” Id. at 544.
471 As proof of this point, there are very few reported cases involving employment
accommodations via technologies such as robotics or VR. Part of the explanation for the dearth of
cases is that these technologies are still new enough that many individuals are not aware of their
availability or that their cost remains prohibitively high.
472 Rather than the ADA’s stick-only approach, tax breaks or other financial incentives may be
merited.
468
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sufficient attention from the public and policymakers. But this haphazard approach
leaves much to be desired, as it will only worsen the current situation, in which
different groups of workers enjoying varying degrees of protection that they may
or may not be able to enforce.
The common thread among these challenges is most of them are as complex
and interrelated as the technologies from which they spring. Problems of this sort
demand an equally coordinated set of responses. Responses that our fragmented
set of federal, state, and local workplace policymakers are unable to produce. We
should, instead, strive for a more comprehensive strategy. One that reflects the
complexity, seriousness, and scope of the problems it’s trying to solve.
This Article lacks the capacity for a full discussion of the path forward, but
some general proposals follow. Central among them is an attack on our fragmented
workplace. Multiple jurisdictions—federal, state, and local—regulate the
workplace in different ways, apportioning or sharing enforcement responsibilities
among various agencies and private actors.473 And even within a single
jurisdiction, numerous statutes regulate different aspects of work.474 As I’ve argued
elsewhere, there have long been strong arguments for minimizing or eliminating
this fragmentation by implementing both “vertical integration” (concentrating
regulation within a single jurisdiction, the federal government) and “horizontal
integration” (minimizing the variety of statutes within a given jurisdiction). 475 The
additional strain that emerging technology will place on this fragmented system
further supports this argument.
This Article has explored ways in which technology will create new problems
for workplace law and exacerbate current ones. Policymakers and private actors
will have to contend with unfamiliar innovations that they don’t fully understand,
making technology’s effect on the workplace difficult to predict and regulate.
Although there is an argument that a decentralized governance process allows for
experimentation that would be beneficial in such circumstances, its potential value
will likely be overwhelmed by the confusion and gaps that it will generate.476 Many
legislatures will simply avoid regulating difficult questions at all, leaving workers
unprotected from a variety of harms. Moreover, if state or local governments are
free to legislate, the result will be a set of disparate rules that make compliance
difficult,477 especially for companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions. 478 The

473 Hirsch, Nationalizing Workplace Law, supra note 174, at 1036-1049 (describing large number
of statutes, including ones governing wages and hours, family and medical leave, employment
benefits, among others, as well as multiple statutes prohibiting different types of discrimination).
474 Id.
475 Id. at 1052-1068 (arguing that, in general, the benefits of a unified set of labor and employment
laws outweighs the costs).
476
Id. at 1053-1064.
477 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 99-100
(2008) (arguing for importance of making employer compliance achievable); see also note 209. This
choice also assumes that federal regulation would have some teeth, which is not necessarily true. For
instance, the tech industry is pushing for the FTC to enforce privacy regulations. Dina TempleRaston, Why the Tech Industry Wants Federal Control over Data Privacy Laws, NPR, Oct. 8, 2018.
But given that agency’s tradition of weak enforcement, such a measure would likely fail to achieve
the promised benefits of a unified approach.
478 Kharpal, supra note 325. California, for instance, recently enacted a law that, among other
things, would allow damage suits against companies that suffer data breaches. A. Bill No. 375 (Cal.
2018). Major tech companies responded by pushing for a federal set of rules that would preempt
California and other states that might follow suit. Temple-Raston, supra note 477 (noting also more
narrowly targeted measures in Illinois and Vermont).
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interrelated nature of many technologies also suggest a coordinated legislative
response. Because technologies are often used together in unexpected ways,
piecemeal legislation that address only isolated issues that have risen to
prominence will be relatively ineffective and incomplete.
For these reasons, a centralization of workplaces laws is ideal, albeit unlikely.
One approach to accomplish this goal would be to establish a new national
regulatory scheme, which I’ll refer to as the “Law of Work.” This unified law
would allow, for example, an amended approach to the employee classification
system479 that would apply throughout the labor market, rather than a disparate set
of classification standards depending on which statute is involved and whether it
is a federal, state, or local provision. But even without a new, comprehensive
workplace law, Congress could make a coordinated legislative effort to address the
broad swath of issues presented by emerging technologies. In addition, Congress
could empower a single agency to enforce whatever legislation it pursues or
already exists. Such an agency would be better positioned to implement
comprehensive and forward-looking policies to address impeding issues. In
contrast, isolated and sporadic responses to the challenges that will accompany
new technology—in addition to the shortcoming of our current workplace
regulatory system—will be insufficient.
Short of a general centralization of work law, more modest approaches are
available. One option that fulfils some of the aims behind the Law of Work is to
develop a targeted response to emerging technology workplace issues. The
Department of Labor, for instance, could create a new department focused on
technology’s impact in the workplace. This department could conduct research,
improve data collection,480 and make policy recommendations, all while
coordinating with relevant players in the public and private sector. Such an effort
would not be a panacea, but it would certainly improve the current situation, where
no single entity is considering the panoply of issues implicated by developing
technologies.
CONCLUSION
Society has long grappled with both technology and changes in the way we
work. But this current period feels different. The breadth and speed of
technological developments and their expected impact on the workplace has the
quality of something more than a typical evolution of work. It’s impossible to
know whether we are on the verge of a new era of work, but the chance is very
real. Unfortunately, the one thing that we do know for sure is that our system of
workplace governance is unprepared for such an occurrence.
If we are entering a technology driven revolution, the ramifications are
immense. Massive job losses, millions of workers falling through the gaps of
already weak protections, a workplace utterly devoid of privacy, tech-enabled
discrimination, and risks to workers’ health and safety are all on the table—as are,
of course, many benefits as well. Even without a true revolution, technology will
unleash many of these same problems, albeit to a lesser degree. In addition, the
workplace is becoming blended, with human work increasingly reliant on
technology—a development that will magnify employers’ control over workers.
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As a result, the existing imbalance of power associated with globalism and other
conditions will worsen, leading to more of the inequality and social disruptions
that have already rocked society in the past decade. 481
Our current fragmented system of workplace laws has already done a poor job
dealing with the challenges of globalism. Technology, at a minimum, will make
these problems more severe. At worst, technology will shatter this system, leaving
a critical mass of workers without any meaningful protection, power, or voice in
the workplace.482 Either way, technology should spur us to reform the way we
regulate work. We should do away with the byzantine set of laws that make
compliance difficult and enforcement near impossible, while still leaving many
workers with inadequate, or no, protections. Technology will bring both good
things and bad to the workplace, but if we don’t prepare, the latter will almost
certainly outweigh the former. Instead, we should use emerging technology as an
opportunity to consider anew our governance of the future of work.

481 Other countries have not been immune to this political and economic unrest, particularly in
Europe. Liz Alderman, These 5 Numbers Explain Why the French Are in the Streets, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2018) (describing expanding “Yellow Vest” protests).
482 See supra note 6 (describing workers unrest that led to federal labor law).
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